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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three essays on economic design and coalition formation. The first 
chapter studies the st ability of many-to-one matching, such as matching between students and 
colleges or interns and hospitals. Complementarities and peer effects are inherent in many 
such matching situations. The chapter provides the first sufficient condition for stability that 
may be used to study matching with complementarities and peer effects. The condition offered 
is shown to be also necessary for stability in some matching problems. 
The second chapter provides a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in coalition 
formation such as the formation of clubs, partnerships, firms, business alliances, and jurisdic- 
tions voting on public goods. The condition is formulated for settings in which agents first 
form coalitions and then each coalition realizes a payoff profile from the set of available alter-. 
natives via a mechanism. In particular, there exists a core coalition structure if the payoffs are 
determined in the Tullock rent-seeking game or Nash bargaining. The core might be empty 
if the payoffs are determined by the Kalai-Smorodinsky or Shapley bargaining solutions. The 
chapter also determines the class of linear sharing rules and regular Pareto-optimal mechanisms 
for which there are core coalition structures. 
The third chapter studies the multidimensional screening problem of a profit-maximizing mo- 
nopolistic seller of goods with multiple indivisible attributes. The buyer's utility is buyer's 
private information and is linear in the probabilities of obtaining the attributes. The chapter 
solves the seller's problem for an arbitrary number of attributes when there are two types of 
buyers, adding a new simple example to the few known examples of solved multidimensional 
screening problems. When there is a continuum of buyer types, the chapter shows that gener- 
ically the seller wants to sell goods with some of the attributes partly damaged, stochastic, 
or leased on restrictive terms. The often-studied simple bundling strategies are shown to be 
generically suboptimal. 
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Chapter 1. Many-to-One Matching without Sub- 
stitut ability 
1. Introduction 
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and 
colleges, interns and hospitals, and workers and firms.' An agent on one side, say a 
firm, can hire as many workers as it needs, and an agent on the other side, a worker, 
can be employed by one firm only or remain unemployed. In this way, the agents form 
coalitions. The class of feasible coalitions is exogenously given. An unemployed worker 
is considered a coalition. All other coalitions consist of a firm and its workforce. 
Gale and Shapley (1962) raised the question of stability of such matchings.' Each 
agent has preferences over the coalitions that contain this agent. A matching is stable 
if (i) no worker prefers to be unemployed rather than to work for the matched firm, (ii) 
no firm wants to keep some positions vacant rather than filling them with a group of 
matched workers, and (iii) no worker-firm pair that is presently unmatched prefers to , 
match. 
The most general known sufficient conditions for stability are substitutability con- 
ditions, which are derived fkom the Kelso and Crawford (1982) gross-substitutes con- 
ditionS2 In a formulation of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), the substitutability condition 
is as follows: if a firm wants to employ a worker w from a large pool of workers, then 
the firm wants to employ w from any smaller pool containing w. Kelso and Crawford 
(1982) show that if firms' preferences satisfy the substitutability condition and there are 
'The college admission problem was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). A recent example 
from the realm of education is the design of a new high school admissions system in New York City, 
which allows both schools and students to influence the matching ( Abdulkadiro~lu, Pathak, and Roth 
2005). Medical labor markets are studied for example in Roth (1984)) Roth (1991)) Roth and Peranson 
(1999), Niederle and Roth (2004)) and McKinney, Niederle, and Roth (forthcoming). Roth (2002) 
provides a survey. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) is a classic survey of theory, empirical evidence, and 
design applications of the many-bone matching models satisfying the above assumption. 
' Starting with the work of Roth (1984) on US matching between interns and hospitals, substantial 
empirical evidence links the lack of stability in matching with market failures. The evidence is surveyed 
in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) and Roth (2002). 
2Cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Echenique and Oviedo (2004b)) Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and 
Ostrovsky (2005). Roth (1985)'s responsiveness condition is also a variant of substitutability. 
no peer effects - that is, workers'p references depend only on the firm they apply to and 
not on who their peers will be - then there exists a stable many-to-one matching. 
There are matching settings that do not satisfy the standard assumptions of sub- 
stitutability and lack of peer effects. The substitutability condition fails if there are 
non-trivial complementarities between workers. It also fails when there are fixed costs. 
The complementarities are non-trivial if, for example, a firm's production process is 
profitable only when adequately staffed. For instance, a biotech firm may not open a 
new R&D lab if it is unable to hire experts in all complementary areas required for the 
lab's work. Substitutability fails for firms with fixed costs if their operations must be of 
some minimal size to ensure profitability. Peer effects are present if workers care about 
interactions in the workplace or if the identity of other workers non-trivially influences 
workloads or other day-to-day bargaining between workers. 
This paper provides a novel sufficient and, in a certain sense, necessary condition for 
stability that may be used to analyze settings with complementarities and peer effects 
such as those mentioned above. The paper also shows that the condition is satisfied 
in several settings of economic importance that have not previously been recognized as 
admitting st able mat chings. 
The main component of the proposed'condition is the pairwise alignment of prefer- 
ences. Agents' preferences are painvise aligned if any two agents in the intersection of 
any two coalitions prefer the same one of the two coalitions. For instance, a firm and 
a worker either both prefer to form a firm-and-one-employee coalition or both prefer a 
larger coalition that includes the firm, the worker, and some other workers. 
The sufficient and, in a certain sense, necessary condition is developed in three 
stages, from specific to more general environments. Stage 1 (Section 2) presents an 
example of matching with payoffs determined by Nash bargaining. Stage 2 (Section 4) 
generalizes this example by replacing Nash bargaining with a broad class of mechanisms. 
This intermediate stage is of independent interest as directly applicable to a range of 
matching situations in which agents are unable to enter binding agreements. Stage 3 
(Section 5) addresses the general problem with agents' preferences as primitives. 
The setting of Stage 1 (Section 2) is as follows. There are two dates. On date 1, 
firms and workers match, that is, form coalitions. On this date, firms and workers cannot 
enter binding employment contracts. In effect, on date 1, the agents' preferences over 
coalitions result from the agents' expectations of the payoffs that will be determined 
on date 2. On date 2, each coalition creates a value and its members divide the value 
according to the Nash bargaining solution. This bargaining determines the agents' 
payoffs. Since each preference profile induced by Nash bargaining is pairwise aligned, 
the pairwise alignment condition is embedded in this setting. 
Stage 1 (Section 2) shows that there is a stable matching in this setting3 This 
stage also proves a stronger property of this matching setting, namely the existence 
of a metaranking. A metaranking is a transitive relation on all coalitions; its defining 
property is that, restricted to coalitions containing an agent, the transitive relation 
agrees with preferences of this agent.4 
Stage 2 (Section 4) discusses matching when payoffs are determined by mechanism. 
This setting preserves the timing and other elements of the setting from Stage 1, except 
that Nash bargaining is replaced by a mechanism from a broad class of games, bargaining 
protocols, and sharing rules. As in the setting of Stage 1, each coalition has a value. 
The mechanism takes the values of coalitions, that is the value function, and generates 
agents' payoffs and preferences over coalitions. 
Stage 2 (Section 4) establishes a sufficient and, in a certain sense, necessary condition 
for stability. It is sufficient for the existence of a stable matching that agents' preferences 
are pairwise aligned for all value functions. It is necessary for the existence of a stable 
matching for all value functions that agents' preferences are pairwise aligned. 
Stage 3 (Section 5) addresses the general problem with agents' preferences as prim- 
itives. At this stage, in contrast to Stage 2, there are no mechanisms. The sufficient 
condition imposes pairwise alignment on agents' preferences from a rich domain of pref- 
erence profiles as it is not sufficient for stability to impose pairwise alignment on a 
single preference pr~fi le .~ An example of a matching situation with pairwise-aligned 
preferences and no stable matching is included in Section 4 to explain why we need 
mechanisms." 
In the general preference framework of Stage 3 (Section 5), the pairwise alignment 
31n this and other settings discussed, there exists a matching that is group stable and not only 
stable. A matching is group stable if no worker prefers to be unemployed rather than to work for the 
matched firm, and no firm may replace some (or no) workers, with some (or no) additional workers so 
that the firm and all the additional workers strictly increase their payoffs. 
"he idea of metarankings was introduced by F'arrell and Scotchmer (1988). See the following 
discussion of literature. 
"ection 5 also discusses the sufficient condition in a form in which the condition does not refer to 
a rich domain of preference profiles. 
'As a heuristic argument consider the roommate problem, in which agents match in pairs, and any 
two agents may form a pair. Preferences are always pairwise aligned, but the existence of a stable 
matching is not assured. 
remains a necessary condition for the existence of stable matchings for all preference 
profiles from large domains of profiles. 
The sufficiency and necessity results proved in this paper allow one to determine 
which sharing rules and games induce the existence of stable matchings. For instance, 
Section 6 determines the class of linear sharing rules and the class of welfare maximiza- 
tion mechanisms that induce the existence of stable matchings. Section 6 also shows 
that there is always a stable matching if agents' preferences are induced by Tullock's 
(1980) rent-seeking game. 
The idea of using painvise alignment to study stability seems to be new. As dis- 
cussed above, the paper proves that the pairwise alignment is related to the idea of 
a metaranking introduced by Farrell and Scotchmer (1988).7 Farrell and Scotchmer 
primarily study the formation of partnerships. They show that the one-sided core is 
non-empty in a coalition formation game followed by an equal division of value. Baner- 
jee, Konishi, and Sonmez (2001) relax the Farrell and Scotchmer metaranking propertf 
and notice that the equal division may be replaced by some other linear sharing rules 
in Farrell and Scotchrner's analysis. Echenique and Yenmez (2005) use metarankings 
to analyze the one-sided core of many-to-one matching. They construct an algorithm 
that finds matchings in the one-sided core if they exist. This algorithm does not rely on 
either substitutability or the lack of peer effe~ts .~ They also verify that their algorithm 
efficiently finds matchings in the one-sided core if the Banerjee, Konishi, and Sirnmez 
(200 1) metaranking-type property is satisfied. 
As a companion paper, Pycia (2005) studies the relation among pairwise alignment, 
met arankings , and coalit ion format ion. The results on st ability presented here are inde- 
pendent of the results of the companion paper because this paper studies many-to-one 
matching, while the companion paper studies one-sided coalition formation. The two 
papers employ independent solution concepts. This paper studies stability, while the 
companion paper studies the one-sided core.'' The papers provide pairwise-alignment- 
'If a metaranking exists, then preferences are pairwise aligned. The converse implication is true in 
the special case studied in Section 4 but not in the general setting of Section 5. 
'The relaxed metaranking property, called the top coalition property, says that each subgroup of 
agents contains a coalition that is weakly preferred by all its members to any other coalition of agents 
in the subgroup. 
gEchenique and Oviedo (2004a) construct an algorithm that finds group stable matchings in many- 
to-one settings if they exist and if there are no peer effects. 
1°The main difference between these two concepts is that stability presumes that a firm can sever 
or establish a match with a worker without taking into account the preferences of other workers the 
based sufficient and necessary conditions for st ability, and non-empt iness of the one-sided 
core, respectively. The conditions, however, are different. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the Nash bargaining example. 
Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 presents the theory of stability in matching 
with mechanisms. Sect ion 5 presents the preference formulation of the results. Sect ion 
6 presents new settings in which stable matchings exist. The last section concludes. 
2. Matching and Nash Bargaining - an Example 
Let us consider the following many-teone matching situation. On date 1, firms 
and workers match, that is, form coalitions. On this date, firms and workers cannot 
enter binding employment contracts. In effect, on date 1, the agents' preferences over 
coalitions reflect the agents' expectations of the payoffs that will be determined on date 
2. On date 2, each resultant coalition, C, creates value v (C) 2 0, and its members divide 
v (C) according to the Nash bargaining solution. That is, each agent i is endowed with 
an increasing and concave utility function Ui, and agents' payoffs si maximize 
subject to 
Thus, agents' preferences over coalitions are induced by Nash bargaining. 
Recall that a matching is stable if no worker prefers to be unemployed rather than 
to work for the matched firm, no firm wants to lay off any group of its workers, and no 
worker-firm pair that is presently unmatched would prefer to match. l1 
Theorem 2.1. If preferences during matching are induced by Nash bargaining, then 
there exists a stable matching. 
- 
firm matches with. The one-sided core presumes that the workers have veto power over the actions of 
the firm. Consequently, a many-to-one matching in the one-sided core need not be stable, and a stable 
matching need not belong to the one-sided core. For details, see the discussion in Section 3. 
"The formal definition is presented in Section 3. 
Ui (si)-Ui (0) Proof. To construct a stable matching, let us first observe that ui(sil , called the 
fear of ruin coefficient,12 is the same for every agent in a coalition that divides value in 
Nash bargaining. Indeed, the Lagrange multiplier in the Nash bargaining maximization 
U! (si) 
equals the inverse of the fear of ruin, Ui(sij-u,(o). Additionally, the larger the fear of ruin 
of an agent is, the more the agent gains in a given coalition. Thus, no agents would ever 
want to change a coalition that maximizes their fear of ruin. Therefore, the coalition 
with maximal fear of ruin may be treated as if its members did not participate in the 
matching between the remaining agents. In this way, one can recursively construct a 
st able matching. This completes the proof. l3 
The above proof may be separated into two steps. The first step constructs an index 
on coalitions - the fear of ruin - such that all relevant agents compare two coalitions 
by looking at this index only. The second step uses the index to recursively construct a 
stable matching. 
The idea for the second step comes from Farrell and Scotchmer (1988). They study 
partnerships that share the surplus equally among their members. That is, if a partner- 
ship of size #C creates value v (C), then each member obtains $$. They use thejndex 
a to recursively construct a structure that belongs to the one-sided core. #C 
Except for the difference in solution concepts, their use of the index 9 is the same as 
our use of the fear of ruin in the second step of the above proof. 
The above two indices, the fear of ruin and g, determine metarankings. A 
metaranking is a transitive relation on all coalitions that, restricted to coalitions con- 
12See Aumann and Kurz (1977a, 1977b) and Roth (1979). 
l3 ~ h r e e  remarks about the Nash bargaining example might be of interest. The above argument, with 
a small modification, may be used to show that a stable matching exists when preferences come from 
an asymmetric Nash bargaining where agent i has bargaining power Ai and the division of value v (C) 
in coalition C maximizes niEc (Ui (si) - Ui (0))" over si 2 0, i E C, subject to CiEc Si < v (C). In 
this extension, the bargaining powers Xi are agent-specific but are not coalition-specific. 
Furthermore, the above argument shows that the matching is group stable and not only stable. A 
formal definition definition of group stability is given in Section 3. Informally, a matching is group 
stable if no worker prefers to be unemployed rather than to work for the matched firm, and no firm 
may fire some (or no) workers, and employ some (or no) additional workers so that the firm and all the 
additional workers strictly increase their payoffs. 
Finally, the values v (C) may either accrue to the entire coalition or be composed of parts that accrue 
to individual members. In the latter case, the existence of a stable matching relies on the assumptions 
that agents' utilities are quasi-linear in a numeraire, and that, after the coalitions are determined, the 
agents can contract. Then, v (C) is the sum of values that accrue to members in an optimal contract. 
taining any particular agent, agrees with preferences of this agent. As in the above 
proof, if there is a metaranking, then there is a matching that is stable. 
The existence of a metaranking is a strong and desirable property of a matching set- 
ting. For instance, Proposition 4.11 in the appendix shows that if there is a metaranking, 
t,hen group stable matchings are obtained as Strong Nash Equilibria14 of a broad class 
of non-cooperative matching games. 
Despite the attractiveness of the existence of metarankings as a property of matching 
situations, it is difficult to use metarankings as a sufficient condition for stability. To 
use metarankings to verify stability requires one to construct an index - such as the fear 
of ruin index above - for each matching setting. 
Sections 4 and 5 solve this problem by connecting the existence of metarankings 
with the pairwise alignment, which is readily verifiable in a variety of settings.15 For 
instance, in Nash bargaining, the pairwise alignment is an immediate consequence of 
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom. ' 
3. Model 
A finite set of agents I is divided into two non-empty disjoint sets, I = F U W. We 
will refer to agents from F as firms, and to agents from W as workers. Each worker 
seeks a firm, and each firm f E F seeks up to Mf workers, where Mf 2 1. A matching 
is a function p from F U W into subsets of F U W, such that 
a p (w) = {f) if the worker w is employed by the firm f ,  and p (w) = {w) if w is 
unemployed, 
p ( f )  c W and the size #p (f)  5 Mf for every firm f , and 
a p (w) = { f )  iff w E p (f) ,  for every worker w and firm f .  
14Cf. Aumann (1959), Rubinstein (1980). We may alternatively use the solution concept of Coalition- 
Proof Nash Equilibrium of Bernheim, Peleg, Whinston (1987). 
'"ection 5 also defines relaxed metarankings and study their connection to stability and pairwise 
alignment. Relaxed met arankings, unlike metar ankings, always exist in one-to-one matching. 
16Cf. Harsanyi (1959). 
Let us use the term coalition to refer to a firm f and all workers matched to f in some 
matching, or to refer to an unemployed worker. Thus, a coalition may consist of a firm 
f and any subset of workers S 5 W of size #S 5 Mf (including S = 0) or of an 
unemployed worker. Let us denote the set of all coalitions by C. Thus, 
C = { { f ) u S :  f E F , S C W , # S I  M f ) u { { w ) : w ~  W ) .  
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between matchings and partitions of I 
into coalitions. In particular, in any matching each agent is associated with exactly one 
coalition. 
Each agent i E I has a preference relation Zi over all coalitions that contain i. The 
profile of preferences ($i)iEI is denoted by 21. This formulation embodies the standard 
assumption that each agent's preferences between two matchings are fully determined 
by members of the coalitions containing this agent in the two matchings. 
We are interested in the existence of stable matchings in the above environment. 
The role of stability - most notably in preventing the unravelling of markets - has been 
elucidated in the empirical work started by Roth (1984). In the following definitions 
of stability and group stability, Cp (2) denotes the coalition containing an agent i in 
matching p. Specifically, the coalition containing a firm f is Cp ( f )  = { f )  U p ( f )  , and 
the coalition containing a worker w  is Cp (w)  = p ( w )  U p  ( p  (w)) .  
Definition 3.1 (Stability).17 A matching p is blocked by a firm f if there exists a 
subset of workers S p ( f )  such that { f }  U S > f  Cp ( f ) .  
A matching p is blocked by a worker w  if {w) +, Cp (w) .  
A matching p is blocked by firm f and worker w $ p ( f )  if there exists S C p ( f )  
such that 
. # ( {w)  u S )  I Mf7 
A matching is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent or any worker-firm 
pair. 
17Cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) Definition 5.3. 
14 
Definition 3.2 (Group Stability).18 A matching p is blocked by a group of 
workers and firms if there exists another matching p' and a group A consisting of multiple 
workers and/or firms, such that for all workers w in A and for all firms f in A, 
p' (w) E A (i.e., every student in A is matched to a college in A); 
a c"' (w) +, Cp (w) (i.e., every student in A prefers the new matching to the old 
one) ; 
a w E p' (f) implies w E A U p (f) (i.e., every firm in A is matched to new workers 
only from A, although it may continue to be matched to some of its "old" workers 
from p (f)); and 
a C"' (f) +r Cp (f) (i.e., every firm in A prefers its new set of workers to its old 
one). 
A matching is group stable if it is not blocked by any group of agents. 
The stability concepts presuppose that a match is between a worker and a firm. 
Both the firm and the worker can unilaterally sever the match, and together they can 
establish the match irrespective of other agents' preferences. In particular, even though 
the worker and the firm are members of a coalition composed of the firm and all its 
employees, other coalition members - i.e., other workers - have no veto power over the 
creation or severance of the firm-worker match. This lack of workers' veto power is a 
major difference between the stability in two-sided matching and the one-sided core in 
coalition formation. A matching p is in the one-sided core if there is no coalition A such 
that A +, Cp (a) for each a E A. A stable matching need not belong to the one-sided 
core, and a matching in the one-sided core need not be stable. Group stability is a 
stronger property than both stability and the non-emptiness of the one-sided core.lg 
18Cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) Definition 5.4. 
l g ~ h e  following example illustrates the difference. There is one firm f and two workers wl and w2. 
The firm would most like to hire both workers. A second best option for the firm would be to hire wl, 
the more productive worker, only. The third best would be to hire w2 only. The productive worker, wl, 
does not like to work with w2, and so wl 's preferences are { f ,  wl } t,, {wl } +, { f ,  wl , w2). Worker 
w2 wants to work for firm f irrespective of whether wl is working there, too. The matching in which 
worker wl works for firm f ,  and worker w2 is unemployed, is in the oncsided core. This matching, 
however, is not stable. In fact, in this example, there is no stable matching. 
4. Mechanisms and Stability of Matching 
The basic structure of the matching problems studied in this section is similar to 
the Nash bargaining example discussed in Section 2. The structure is as follows. There 
are two dates. On date 1, firms and workers match, that is, form coalitions. On this 
date, firms and workers cannot enter binding employment contracts. Consequently, the 
agents form their preferences by foreseeing what will happen on date 2. On date 2, each 
resultant coalition C realizes a payoff profile from the set of feasible payoffs 
where v (C) is the value of coalition C and v : C --+ R+ is the value function. We 
allow the payoffs to represent expected payoffs from lotteries over a larger space of 
outcomes. Coalition C realizes a feasible payoff profile by playing some game, following 
some bargaining protocol, or using some sharing rule. For instance, in the example of 
Section 2, the payoff profile was chosen via Nash bargaining. Other examples - such as 
Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game or linear sharing rules - are discussed in Section 6. 
A post-matching mechanism (or, mechanism) is a game or a choice rule that players 
use to decide which profile of payoffs will be realized. The following definition of a post- 
matching mechanism identifies each such game or rule with resulting agents' payoffs 
because ultimately the stability properties of any matching problem are determined by 
these payoffs alone. 
Definition 4.1 (Mechanism). A post-matching mechanism is a function G that 
for every coalition C and value v (C) determines nonnegative payoffs G (i, C, v (C)) for 
all members i E C so that 
For example, an equal division rule operating on a coalition C with value v (C) 
produces payoffs G (i, C, v (C)) = g. 
This section discusses mechanisms that do not discriminate against any worker w in 
any coalition C in the sense defined below. For the sake of the definition, let us denote 
the set of payoffs that agent i may receive in coalition C for various values v (C) by 
Using this notation, we may state the following 
Definition 4.2 (Non-discrimination) . A post-matching mechanism is non-disc rim in at^^ 
if for any worker w, and coalitions C, C 3 w the sets of payoffs are equal U (2, C) = 
u (2, C1). 
All above-mentioned mechanisms - Nash bargaining, equal division, the Tullock 
rent-seeking - are non-discriminat~r~.~~ 
We are further assuming that the mechanism is monotonic and continuous, i.e., an 
increase in the value of a coalition continuously improves the payoffs of all agents in the 
coalition. 
Definition 4.3 (Monotonicity and Continuity). A mechanism is monotonic if 
for any agent i and coalition C 3 i the payoff G (i, C, 5 )  is increasing in 5 2 0. A 
mechanism is continuous if G (2, C, 6) is continuous in 6 2 0. 
All above-mentioned mechanisms are monotonic and continuous. Any monotonic 
mechanism that produces Pareto optimal payoffs21 is continuous. 
This section provides a sficient and necessary condition for the existence of stable 
mat chings for all preference profiles induced by a non-discriminat ing and monotonic 
mechanism. These conditions build on the notion of pairwise aligned preferences. Recall 
that preferences are pairwise aligned if all agents in an intersection of two coalitions 
prefer the same coalition of the two. 
Definition 4.4 (Pairwise Alignment). Preferences are pairwise aligned if for all 
i, j E I and coalitions C, C1 3 i, j ,  we have 
In particular, then C Ni C iff C N j  C', and C +i C1 iff C > j  C1. Preferences 
generated by Nash bargaining in the setting of Section 2 are pairwise aligned. 
20A mechanism that chooses payoffs (ui)iEC that maximize a welfare functional CiEc Wi ( ~ i )  is non- 
discriminatory if the welfare components Wi satisfy an Inada type condition Wl (u) -+ 0 as u -t oo. If 
this condition fails, the welfare maximization mechanism may be discriminatory, for instance, if Wi (u) 
and W; (u) tend to 0 as u -+ oo but Wi (u) > 1 for all u. 
21 Given the set of feasible payoffs, the payoffs are Pareto optimal if CiEc G (i, C, 6 )  = 6. 
The sufficient and necessary condition for stability is given by the following. 
Theorem 4.5 (Sufficiency and Necessity). Suppose that there are at least two 
firm and that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. A non-discriminatory, 
monotonic, and continuous post-matching mechanism induces pairwise-aligned prefer- 
ence profiles if, and only if, there is a stable matching for each induced preference profile. 
Moreover, if the mechanism generates pairwise-aligned preferences, then there is a group 
stable matching for each induced preference profile. 
We first prove the sufficiency part, then comment on the proof of the necessity part, 
and end this section with a discussion of which assumptions may be dropped and which 
assumptions may be relaxed. 
The proof of the sufficiency part is in two steps. The first step shows that under 
the assumptions of the theorem there is a metaranking. The second step is identical 
to the second step in the proof of Theorem 2.1, and hence is skipped. Recall that a 
metaranking is defined as follows. 
Definition 4.6 (Metaranking). A metaranking is a transitive relation.+ on all 
coalitions such that for any i E I and C, C' 3 i, 
C zi C' - C =$ C'. 
Two examples of metarankings determined by indices were discussed in Section 2: 
the fear of ruin coefficient in a matching followed by Nash bargaining and the per-head 
value of a coalition in a matching followed by equal division of value. The appendix 
discusses non-cooperative implementation of matching when there is a metaranking. 
We reduced the proof of the sufficiency part of Theorem 4.5 to the following. 
Proposition 4.7 (Existence of a Metaranking). Suppose that all firms are able 
to employ at least two workers. If a non-discriminatory and monotonic post-matching 
mechanism induces pairwise-aligned preference profiles, then for each induced preference 
profile there is a met aranking. 
Proof. Because of monotonicity, G (a, C, v' (C)) = G (a, C, v (C)) implies G (b, C, v' (C)) = 
G (b, C, v (C)) for any values v (C) , v' (C). Thus, we can define the payoff translation 
fundions tCa : U (a, C) -+ U (a, C) for each coalition C and agents a, b E C by the 
condition 
t& (G (a, C, 6)) = G (b, C, 6) , 5 2 0. 
The non-discrimination implies that U (a, C) = U (a, C') for C, C' 3 a, and the pairwise 
alignment guarantees that tCa = tCi. Since there is a firm able to employ two workers, 
so t6,a is defined whenever at least one of the agents a and b is a worker. 
Choose an arbitrary reference worker w* and fix the value function v : C + R+. 
Because of the non-discrimination assumption, t W * ,  (G (a, C, v (C))) is well defined for 
any agent a and coalition C 3 a even when w* @ C. By pairwise consistency, 
for any different a, a' E C. Indeed, if w* E C then the claim follows straightforwardly 
fiom the pairwise consistency. If w* $ C, then first consider the case when a is a firm 
and a' is a worker. Then a is able to employ two workers and {a, a', w*) is a coalition. 
By the non-discrimination, there is a value function v' : C + R+ such that 
G (a', C, v' (C)) = G (a', {a, a', w*) , v' ({a, a', w*))) , and 
v' (C) = v (C) . 
Then, the pairwise alignment implies that also 
G (a, C, v' (C)) = G (a, {a, a', w*) , v' ({a, a', w*))) . 
Since w* E {a, a', w*), we have 
tw* ,a (G (a, C, v (C))) = tw* ,a (G (a, C, v' (C) )) 
= tw* ,a (G (a, {a, a', w*) v' ({a, a', w*)))) 
- 
- tw*,al (G (a', {a, a', w*) 7 U' ({a', a', w*)))) 
- tw* ,a1 (G (a', C7 v' (C)) ) 
- 
- tw*,al (G (a', C, v (C))) -
In the remaining case, both a and a' are workers. Then C contains also a firm f, and 
by the preceding argument 
tw* ,a (G (a, C, v (C))) = tw* , j  (G (f C, v (C))) = tw* ,a/ (G (a', C, v (C))) - 
Consequently, 
x (C) = tw* ,a (G (a, C, V (C))) 
does not depend on a if C is fixed. Monotonicity of the mechanism implies that x (C) 
determines a met aranking. This completes the proof. 
The necessity part of Theorem 4.5 will be proved when we prove a stronger Theorem 
5.12. The proof is in the appendix to Section 5, and makes two steps. A first step 
considers certain configurations of coalitions Cly2, C2,3, C3, such that there is an agent 
ai E Ci-l,i n Ci,i+l for i = 1, . .., 3 (we adopt the convention that subscripts are modulo 
3 that is CiTi+1 = C3,1 if i = 3 and Ci-l,i = C3,1 if i = I). In these configurations, if 
ClY2 -, C2,~  and C2,3 C3,i then Clg2 -al C3,1. The second steps shows then this 
property implies pairwise alignment .22 
Let us finish this section with the discussion of assumptions. First notice, that for 
monotonic non-discriminatory mechanisms the pairwise alignment assumption may be 
relaxed. 
Lemma 4.9. If a non-discriminatory monotonic mechanism induces preferences 
such that 
C -i C a C - j  C' 
for all i, j E C, C E C, then preferences generated by the mechanism are pairwise 
. , aligned. 
Proof. Fix i, j E I and C, C 3 i, j. It is enough to consider the case i # j and 
C # C' . Assume that the value function v is such that C zi C in the induced preference 
profile 5. Use the non-discrimination to find a value v' (C) such that C -: C in the 
induced preference profile 5;. Then, v' (C) 2 v (C) and C N; C'. The monotonicity of 
the mechanism implies that C zj C'. This completes the proof. 
The pairwise alignment assumption may also be relaxed in other ways. Consider 
for example the asymmetric Nash bargaining model presented in Section 2. When the 
bargaining power of a worker becomes 0, this worker becomes a wage taker indifferent 
to all employment options, and a stable matching still exists.23 
2 2 ~ h e  n cessity part of Theorem 4.5 provides some guidance for a social planner that wants to ensure 
the existence of a stable matching, intervenes to influence the game or rule that dictates the division 
of value, and does not know the set of payoffs that coalitions are able to create. Cf. Roth (1984) 
and other papers on the matching in medical labor markets cited in the introduction. These authors 
provide empirical evidence that lack of stability is related to the unravelling of markets. They also 
discuss efforts of medical associations to design the matching environment in such a way as to ensure 
stability. 
2 3 ~ n  fact, if there is a metaranking in a matching problem, and the preferences are modified so 
that some agents become indifferent between some of the coalitions and their outside option, then the 
modified problem still admits a stable matching. 
The assumptions about the mechanism may be considerably relaxed. Before dis- 
cussing how they are relaxed in Section 5, let us notice that even for the sufficiency 
part, it is not enough to assume that a single preference profile is pairwise aligned. The 
following situation illustrates the problem. 
Example 4.10. There are three workers W ~ , W ~ , W Q  and three firms flY2, f2,3, f3,1. 
Let us adopt the convention that the subscripts are modulo 3, that is, wi+l = wl if 
i = 3. Assume that only three firm-worker coalitions { fi,i+l, wi , wi+l), i = 1,2,3, create 
positive payoffs for their members. Let the payoffs in coalition {fi,i+l, wi, wi+1) be such 
that wi obtains 2 and wi+l obtains 1. 
In this example, the resultant preferences of agents are pairwise aligned. At the 
same time, there is no group stable matching. There are stable matchings given by the 
pastitions {{fi,i+l, wi, wi+l) {fi+l,i+2) {fi+2,i) , {wi+2)), i = 1,273- It is easy to modify 
the example so that there is no stable matching. It is enough to assume that agents' 
payoffs in coalitions { fi+1,i+2, wi+2) are negligible, but positive. 
The next section relaxes Theorems 4.5 and Proposition 4.7 in several ways. 
First, the monotonicity and continuity assumptions, as well as the assumption that 
there are at least two firms, are not needed in the sufficiency part of Theorem 4.5 and 
Proposition 4.7 (cf. Theorems 5.2 and 5.10). 
Second, the result may be presented in terms of preference profiles without reference 
to a post-matching mechanism. Section 5 replaces the presence of a non-discriminatory 
mechanism with another, subst antially weaker but more technical, condition that the 
preference profile belongs to a rich domain of pairwise-aligned profiles. Each domain 
of preference profiles generated by a non-discriminatory mechanism is rich; there are, 
however, rich domains that cannot be rationalized as corning from a non-discriminat ory 
mechanism. Notice that, stated directly in terms of preference profiles, the results 
of Section 5 may be more readily applied to settings where agents' preferences are 
determined before the matching by institutional constraints. 
Third, the sufficient conditions for stability in Section 5 are applicable also to settings 
that do not admit a metaranking. 
Fourth, Section 5 removes the restriction that all firms are able to employ at least 
two workers. Theorem 5.8 replaces this restriction with a weak assumption on one- 
worker firms, that is, firms that can employ at most one worker. As a consequence, the 
sufficient condition of Theorem 5.8 is satisfied, for instance, in the Gale and Shapley 
(1 962) marriage markets. 
5. Preference Formulation of Stability Conditions 
This section presents sufficient and necessary conditions for stability in a preference 
formulation. Unlike the results of Section 4, the stronger results of this section do not 
rely on the preferences being induced by a post-matching mechanism. As such, they are 
more directly applicable to the college admission problem. 
Recall that Example 4.10 shows that the pairwise alignment of preference alone does 
not guarantee that a stable matching exists. As is shown in the present section, it is 
enough to assume pairwise consistency on the preference profile in question, and on some 
related profiles. In Section 4, the domain of profiles generated by a mechanism played 
this role. In the present section we will assume the existence of these other profiles 
directly - by imposing a pairwise alignment restriction on a domain of preference 
profiles. 
To introduce our results, let us consider a simple matching problem with payoffs 
determined in Nash bargaining. Suppose that two firms fl, f2 and two workers wl, w2 
match on date 1. On this date, they are not able to commit to terms of employment. 
On date 2, each coalition creates a value and divides it according to the Nash bargaining 
solution. As we know from Theorem 2.1, a stable mgtching exists in this setting. , 
Let us consider a heuristic for an alternative proof of Theorem 2.1. This proof, while 
more complex than the proof offered in Section 2, introduces the ideas used in the proofs 
of the stronger counterparts of Theorem 4.5 discussed in the present section. 
If a stable matching does not exist, then there would be a cycle of coalitions such that 
each coalition contains an agent who strictly prefers the next coalition in the cycle. For 
example, worker wl would prefer i f2,  wl, w2) to {fly wl), firm fl would prefer Ifl, wl) 
to { fl, wz), and worker w2 would prefer { fl, w2) to { f2,  wl, w2}. 
To show that this cannot happen, let us consider an auxiliary matching situation 
between firms fl ,  f2 and workers wl, w2 in which (i) the agents still divide the values 
according to the Nash bargaining solution, (ii) the values created by all coalitions except 
for C = { fl, wl, wz) are the same as in the original matching situation, and (iii) the value 
created by coalition C is such that worker w2 is indifferent between C and { f2 ,  wl, wz). 
In this auxiliary situation, the preferences of agents between coalitions from the above 
cycle are unchanged. The preferences are pairwise aligned because they are induced by 
Nash bargaining. Because of the pairwise alignment of preferences between w2 and wl, 
worker wl would be indifferent between C and { fi, wl , w2}, and hence wl would prefer 
C to { fl, wl). Again, because of the pairwise alignment of preferences between wl and 
fi ,  firm fi would prefer C to {fi, wl), and hence to { fl, w2). Firm fl's strict preference 
for C over { fl, wz) would contradict the pairwise alignment of preferences of fl and w2 
over coalitions C and { fl , w2). 
This contradiction proves that the cycle we started with cannot occur in the auxiliary 
situation, and hence it cannot occur in our example. So far, we have analyzed an 
illustrative cycle. To complete the proof and conclude that a stable matching exists, 
we need to show that there are no other cycles. The argument that there are no other 
cycles builds on the above analysis and is further developed following the statement of 
Theorem 5.2, and is completed in the appendix. 
The role of Nash bargaining in the above heuristic argument is to ensure that there 
is an auxiliary situation in which the preferences are pairwise aligned, worker w2 is 
indifferent between C and { f2, wl, w2), and preferences between coalitions other than C 
are inherited fiom the original preference profile. Nash bargaining may be replaced in 
the above example by any other non-discriminatory post-matching mechanism. Thus, 
the argument whose main thrust is presented above may be used to prove the sufficiency 
part of Theorem 4.5 even if we drop the monotonicity and continuity assumptions. 
In fact, the above heuristic argument requires only that the preference profile whose 
stability we analyze is embedded in a domain of pairwise-aligned profiles that is rich 
in the following sense. For any preference profile in the domain, any worker, and any 
two coalitions (of size 3 or more) containing the worker, there exists a profile in the 
domain in which the worker is indifferent between the two coalitions and, save for one 
coalition, agents' preferences over coalitions are intact. More informally, the rich domain 
of preference profiles allows us to make any worker indifferent between two coalitions 
(of size 3 or more), while keeping preferences between all but one coalition intact. 
Definition 5.1 (Rich Domain). A domain of preference profiles R is rich if for 
any worker w E W, coalitions C, C' 3 w such that #C, #Cf > 3, and any Zr€ R, 
there exists a profile Z>E R such that C N: C' and all agents' 5; preferences between 
coalitions other than C are the same as in Z I  . 
A domain of all preference profiles that might be generated in the Nash bargaining 
of Section 2 for different value functions v : C --t R+ is rich. Any non-discriminatory 
mechanism induces a rich domain of preference profiles when applied to different config- 
urations of coalitions' payoff profile sets.24 The domain of all profiles in any matching 
problem is also rich. 
24~enot ing by ui (C) agent i utility from joining coalition C, and by ur the profile of utilities of 
23 
The main result of the paper is that if a preference profile belongs to a rich domain 
of pairwisealigned profiles, then there exists a stable matching. This result contains 
Theorem 4.5. 
Theorem 5.2 (Sufficiency). Suppose that all firms are able to employ at least 
two workers. If a preference profile ;jr belongs to a rich domain of pairwise aligned 
preference profiles, then zr admits a matching that is stable and group stable. 
A heuristic argument for why we may expect Theorem 5.2 to be true was presented 
at the beginning of this section. Let us develop it here. The proof of the theorem has two 
main steps. The first step shows that there are no cycles of coalitions C1,2, C2,3, .. . , Cm,l 
for some m 2 2 such that 
(a) There exists ai E Ci-l,i n Ci,i+l for i = 1, . .., m and Ci-lPi 5, Cic+1. 
(b) For at least one i the preference is strict Ci-1,i 4, Ci,i+l and at least one of 
Ci-ls, CiYi+l has three or more members. 
Let us refer to such cycles as blocking cycles. The second step shows that if there are 
no blocking cycles then there exists a group stable matching. Let us first discuss, the 
more difficult first step, and then the easier second step. 
A blocking cycle cannot have length 2. Indeed, Czyl ;ja, C1,2 Za2 C2,1 and the 
pairwise alignment imply that C2,1 wa, Cly2 wa2 C2,1. A blocking cycle cannot have 
length 3 when one of the agents al, a2, a3 is a firm. Indeed, assume that there is a cycle 
and C3,1 has three or more members. If two or three of the agents al, a2, a3 are firms, 
then this is the same firm, and one can use the transitivity of this firm's preferences and 
pairwise alignment of preference to show that all agents are indifferent on the cycle. If 
exactly one of the agents al, a2, a3 is a firm, then there is a coalition C = {al, az, a3) 
and we may use a slightly modified argument from the opening of this section. 
agents i E I ,  we may express a utility counterpart of the rich domain condition as follows. For any 
worker w E W, coalitions C, C' 3 i, and any utility profile ur there exists utility profile u; such that 
?I: (C) = uk (C') and u: C = uj C for all j E I and coalitions 61 # C. A natural question one (-1 (-1 
may ask is whether on any rich domain of preference profiles one may impute utilities so that the above 
utility counterpart of richness is satisfied. In general, the answer is no. A counterexample is presented 
in the appendix. 
If C is different from the coalitions C3,i, C1,2, C2,3, then there exists a pairwise-aligned 
preference profile 5 ; ~  R such that 
and 
C3,1 Zh, C1,2 Zh, C2,3 Zh3 C3,1 
with indifference if there was an zr indifference in the cycle. A repeated application of 
the pairwise-alignment property of z;, shows that 
al is 5; indifferent between C and C3,1, and thus prefers C to C1,2; 
a2 prefers C to Cl,z, and thus to G , 3 ;  and 
a3 prefers C to C2,3, and thus to C3,1. 
None of the preferences on the cycle may be strict, as otherwise a3 would strictly prefer 
C to C3,i, contrary to as's indifference between these two coalitions. 
If C equals one of the coalitions C3,;, C1,2, then we can repeat the above argu- 
ment without the need to refer to the rich domain. 
To show that there are no other blocking cycles requires overcoming some obstacles. 
The main obstacle is the lack of a single coalition containing all agents a1 , . . . , am. In fact, 
such a coalition does not exist if two of the agents are firms. Even when the cycle has 
length 3 and all agents al, a2, a3 are workers, there may not exist a coalition containing 
all three agents if all firms are able to employ at most two workers. How to overcome 
this obstacle is shown in the proof presented in the appendix.25 
The second step in the proof of Theorem 5.2 is easier. It requires us to show that the 
lack of blocking cycles is a sufficient condition for stability. One could show it directly. 
Let us take, however, a longer route, in order to re-express this sufficient condition in a 
more informative way, and highlight the connection with the existence of metarankings. 
First let us define. 
Definition 5.3 (Relaxed Metaranking). A relaxed metaranking is a transitive 
relation 4 on all coalitions such that 
25~heorem 5.2 is proved as a corollary of more general Theorem 5.8, which relaxes the assumption 
that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. The proof of Theorem 5.8 is in the appendix. 
(1) For each agent i E I, and coalitions C, C' 3 i, 
C zi C implies C =$ C' . 
(2) For each agent i E I, and coalitions C, C' 3 i such that at least one of C , C  has 
three or more members, 
C =$ C implies C zi C'. 
Each metaranking is also a relaxed metaranking. An identity relation on coalitions 
in the marriage problem is a relaxed metaranking for any profile of agents' preferences. 
Roughly speaking, a relaxed metaranking has two properties: (i) the coalitions higher 
in the ranking are preferred to the coalitions lower in the ranking by all relevant agents, 
and (ii) if two coalitions share the same level in the ranking, then either all relevant 
agents are indifferent between them, or both coalitions have at most two members. 
Lemma 5.4. There exists a relaxed metaranking if and only if there are no blocking 
cycles. I 
Proof. (+ ) For an indirect proof, consider coalitions C12, C23..  , Cml such that 
ai E Ci-1,i n Gi+l, i E (1, . . ., m), satisfy conditions (a) and (b) of the definition of a 
blocking cycle. By symmetry, we can assume that # (Cm,l) > 3 and CmY1 +, C19. 
Then C1,2 =$ C2,3, C2,3 =$ C3,*, etc., and by transitivity Cly2 =$ Cm,l. Thus Cl,2 zal Cm,l, 
contradicting Cm,l +,, C1,2. 
(+) Define relation =$ so that C =$ C whenever there exists a sequence of coalitions 
Ci,i+l E C such that 
a there is an agent ai E Ci-l,i n Ci,i+1 such that Ci-l,i +ai Ci,i+l. 
Then =$ is transitive. It remains to verify conditions (1) and (2). To prove (1) take 
C1,2 = C, C2,3 = C' and a1 = i. To prove (2), assume that C or C' has three or more 
members, that i E C n C', and that C =$ C'. Now, if C +i C', then there would exist a 
blocking cycle; hence C Zi C'. This completes the proof. 
Given the equivalence between the lack of blocking cycles and the existence of relaxed 
metarankings, to complete the second step in the proof of Theorem 5.2 it is enough to 
show the following. 
Proposition 5.5 (Sufficiency). If there exists a relaxed metaranking, then there 
is a group stable matching. 
Proof. The theorem is true if I contains only one agent. Let us assume that the 
theorem is true on any subset of I to prove the general case by induction. 
Let =$ be the relaxed metaranking. Consider the family of coalitions 
CmaX = {C : there does not exist coalition C' such that C 4 C') , 
which is non-empty since there is only a finite number of coalitions and =$ is transitive. 
If there is Co E Cmax such that # (Co) 1 3, then notice that Co ki C for any i E Co 
and C 3 i. By the inductive assumption, there exists a partition {Cl , . . . , Ck) that 
corresponds to a group stable matching on I - Co. Then {Co, Cl , . . . , Ck) is a partition 
of I that determines a group stable matching. 
In the remaining case, all C E Cmax have two or fewer members. Consider a one- 
to-one matching between firm from F and workers from W with preferences inherited 
from Sr. By Gale and Shapley's (1962) result, there exists a group stable matching in 
this new problem; let 
Q = {Ci, ..., Ck} 
be a partition of I that corresponds to such group stable matching. We can assume 
that C;, ..., Ci E Cmax and C;,,, ..., C;( $! Cmax for some k 2 0. Notice that for any 
C' E Cmax, any agent i E C' strictly prefers C' to any C 6 Cmax containing i. Indeed, if 
C' N Z  4. C then C' =$ C and hence C E CmaX. Thus, k 2 1. 
By the inductive assumption, there is a group stable many-to-one matching on I - 
C; - ... - Ci. Let 
be the corresponding partition of I - C( - ... - CL. 
Now, it is enough to notice that C( , . . . , Ci, C;, . . . , C$ is a group stable many-to-one 
matching on I. Indeed, if it is not group stable then there would exist a blocking group 
A that includes an agent a E C,! for some i E (1, . . . , k). Agent i would prefer a coalition 
C to Cl. There would be two options. If C E Cma, then matching Q would not be group 
stable, contrary to its construction. If C $ Cmax, then C,! +, C (by the same argument 
that we used above to show that k 2 1). Thls strict preference would contradict the 
assumption that Ci 5, C. This completes the proof.26 
Theorem 5.2 presumed that each firm is able to employ at least two agents. If 
there are firms that cannot employ more than one worker, then the pairwise alignment 
condition is no longer sficient for st ability,27 as the following example demonstrates. 
Example 5.6. Let F = { fl, f2) and W = {wl, w2). Let the firms' employment 
capacities equal Mfl = 1 and Mf2 = 2. Let the preference profile be such that 
{fl, w1) +w1 ( f 2 , ~ l r  w2) +Wl (f2, w1) +Wl { ~ l ) ,  
{fi,wl, ~ 2 )  +w2 {fir ~ 2 )  +w2 If27 ~ 2 )  +w2 ( ~ 2 )  , 
{ f 1 , ~ 2 )  + f l  {fi,wi) + f l  {fl) , and 
If27 ~ 1 ,  ~ 2 )  * f 2  {f27 ~ 2 )  +w2 {f2,  wl) +w2 ( f 2 )  
There does not exist a stable matching, the main reason being that 
{fi,wi) +wl (f2rwir ~ 2 )  +w2 { f i r  ~ 2 )  + j l  Ifl, wl) . 
On the other hand, $I  is pairwise aligned. Moreover, the domain of all pairwise-aligned 
, 
preference profiles is rich. 
Thus, in order to extend Theorem 5.2 to cases of many-to-one matching with one- 
worker firms, i.e., firms with employment capacity Mf = 1, we need an additional 
assumption. The assumption is based on the idea of a blocking one-worker firm, i.e., a 
one-worker firm that belongs to a blocking-like cycle of three coalitions. 
Definition 5.7 (Blocking One-Worker Firm). A firm f unable to employ more 
than one worker is a blocking one-worker firm if there exist workers w, wf E W and a 
coalition C 3 w, w' such that 
{f W) k w  C k w '  {f r w') kf {f r W) 
2 6 ~ n  fact, this proof demonstrates that a slightly weaker condition is sufficient for group stability. 
This condition says that in any subset of agents either there is a coalition that is weakly preferred by all 
its members to all other coalitions in the subset, or there is a group of one- and two-member coalitions 
that are weakly preferred by all its members to any coalition not in the group. This condition is weaker 
than both the existence of a relaxed metaranking and the Banerjee, Konishi, and Sanmez (2001) top 
coalition property mentioned in the introduction. 
270ne-to-one matching is an exception. If the matching is oneto-one then all profiles are pairwise 
aligned and admit stable matchings. 
with one preference strict. 
Using this notion we may state the following. 
Theorem 5.8 (Sufficiency). If a preference profile belongs to a rich domain of 
pairwisealigned preference profiles and there are no blocking one-worker firms, then 
there is a matching that is stable and group stable. Moreover, there exists a relaxed 
met aranking. 
This result contains Theorem 5.2 because in the latter there are no one-worker firms. 
This strengthened result covers the Gale and Shapley marriage market in which all 
preference profiles are pairwise aligned and no one-worker firm can be blocking because 
there are no cycles of three coalitions. There are no cycles of three coalitions because 
there are no firms able to employ two workers. 
The heuristic for Theorem 5.8 is identical to the one for Theorem 5.2. The proof is 
presented in the appendix. 
Let us finish this section with two results connecting pairwise alignment, relaxed , : 
metarankings, and metarankings. The first result is afi observation that every preference 
profile that admits a relaxed metaranking may be embedded in a rich domain of pairwise 
aligned preference profiles. 
Proposition 5.9. (a) If a preference profile admits a relaxed metaranking then it 
is pairwise aligned and there are no blocking one-worker firms. 
(b) The domain of profiles admitting a relaxed metaranking is rich. 
The proof of (a) is straightforward. The proof of (b) is in the appendix. 
The second result says when pairwise alignment on a domain of preferences implies 
that there exists a met ar anking. 
Theorem 5.10 (Existence of a Metaranking). Suppose that there is a firm 
able to employ two or more workers and that a domain of preference profiles R satisfies 
the following condition. For any agent i E I, coalitions C, C 3 i, and any R, 
there exists a profile $;E R such that C N; C' and all agents' 5;-preferences between 
coalitions other than C are the same as in zI. If preference profiles in domain R are 
pairwise aligned and are such that there are no blocking one-worker firms, then each 
preference profile in R admits a metaranking. 
The proof relies on the same ideas as the proofs of Theorems 5.2 and 5.8, and is 
presented in the appendix. It is easy to modify the proof of Proposition 5.9 to show 
that the domain of preference profiles admitting a metaranking satisfies the domain 
condition of Theorem 5.10. 
Let us finish with a necessity counterpart of our results. The assumptions are for- 
mulated using the following notion of a perturbation of preference profile that (i) keeps 
all preferences between coalitions except for a reference coalition C, and (ii) perturbs 
agents' preferences over C in a co-monotonic way. 
Definition 5.11 (Monotonic C-Perturbation) . Given a coalition C, we say that 
a preference profile 2; is a monotonic C-perturbation of a profile zI if: 
a For any agent j E I and coalitions Cl, C2 f C containing j we have 
a If there is i E C and C 3 i such that C ki C" and C 4: Ctt, then for any j E I 
, . and C 3 j ,  if C zj Ct, then C (4;. Ct. 
a If there is i E C and C 3 i such that C Zi C' and C >: Ct, then for any j E I 
and C 3 j ,  if C kj Ct then C >; Ct. 
For instance, if a preference profile belongs to the domain of preferences gener- 
ated by a monotonic non-discriminatory mechanism, then the domain also contains its 
monotonic C-perturbations. 
Theorem 5.12 (Necessity). Suppose that either there are at least two firms able 
to employ two or more workers each, or that there are no such firms. Suppose also that 
a domain of preferences R satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) For any agent i E I ,  coalitions C, C 3 i such that #Ct 2 3, and any zI E R, there 
exists a monotonic C-perturbation $;E R such that C N: Ct. 
(2) For any agent i E I ,  coalitions C, Ct 3 i, and any ZI€ R, there exists a monotonic 
C-perturbation $;E R such that C 5: C'. 
(3) For any agent i E I, coalitions C, Ct 3 i, and any R such that C Ct, there 
exists a monotonic C-perturbation Z;E R such that 
. C +: C'. 
for any j E C if C" > j  C then C" +; C- 
for any j E C if C + j  C then C" 4; C. 
Then, if all profiles from R admit a stable matching, then all profiles from R are pairwise 
aligned and are such that there are no blocking one-worker firms.28 
This theorem generalizes the necessity part of Theorem 4.5 and is proved in the 
appendix. The two main steps of the proof are discussed in Section 4. The final step 
makes use of the following. 
Remark 5.13. As in Lemma 4.9, if a domain of preference profiles R satisfies (I), 
and for all 2, j E C, C E C, 
C C' C - j  C', 
then preferences in R are pairwise aligned. 
The next section applies the theoretical results of the paper to some examples. 
6. Applications and Examples 
This section adds to the Nash bargaining example of Section 2 three further exam- 
ples of settings in which our results on mechanisms of Section 4 are applicable. The 
mechanisms considered are linear sharing rules, maximization of a welfare objective, 
and Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game. The section also determines the class of non- 
discriminatory, monotonic, and Pareto optimal mechanisms that induce pairwise aligned 
profiles, and hence st able mat chings. 
We consider the setting of Section 4. Recall that there are two dates. On date 1, 
firms and workers match but do not contract. Agents' preferences are determined by 
their payoffs on date 2. On date 2, each coalition C realizes a payoff profile from the 
set of feasible payoffs 
2 8 ~ h e  domain of all preference profiles that admit a relaxed metaranking satisfies the assumptions 
(1)-(3)- 
where v (C) is the value of coalition C and v : C -, R+ is the value function. We 
allow the payoffs ui to represent expected payoffs from lotteries over a larger space of 
outcomes. Coalition C realizes a payoff profile by playing some game, following some 
bargaining protocol, or using some sharing rule. 
Linear sharing rules. On date 2, agents divide the value using a coalition-specific 
linear sharing rule. The share of agent i in the value created by coalition C is kigc. This 
agent obt aim 
~i = k i ,C~  (C) . 
The shares kiYc > 0 are coalition-specific, xi,, kigc = 1, and kiTc do not depend on the 
realization of v (C). 
In this case, the pairwisealignment requirement takes the following simple form. 
Corollary 6.1 (Sufficiency). If agents divide the values using a linear sharing rule 
with shares kYc, then there exists a stable matching if 
for all C, C' and i, j E C n C'.29 
This corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.5 because linear sharing 
rules with kiYc > 0 are nondiscriminatory, monotonic, and continuous. This corollary 
follows from Theorem 4.5 even if there are firms that can employ only one worker. We 
need, then, to reinterpret each such firm as being able to employ two workers, but 
generating the value 0 if employing two workers.30 
The condition on shares is also necessary, in the following sense. 
Corollary 6.2 (Necessity). Suppose that there are at least two firms able to 
employ two or more workers each. If agents divide the values using a linear sharing rule 
with shares kYc, and there exists a stable matching for all value functions v : C -+ R+, 
then 
2g~anar jee ,  Konishi, and Sonmez (2001) showed that this class of linear sharing rules leads to non- 
empty one-sided core in coalition formation. Pycia (2005) constructs a slightly larger class of linear 
sharing rules that guarantees non-emptiness of the one-sided core in coalition formation. Only the 
linear sharing rules from this larger class guarantee that the one-sided core is non-empty for all value 
functions v. 
"By the remark following Lemma 4.9, we can also extend the result to allow for ki,c = 0. 
for d l  C, C and i, j E C n Ct. 
This corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.12. 
Notice, that if agents' utilities are Ui (s) = s X i ,  then the Nash bargaining will lead 
to linear division of value, and the resultant sharing rule will satisfy the above condi- 
tion. Corollary 6.2 implies a partial converse of this statement. If there are firms able 
to employ two workers, and a profile of shares guarantees an existence of stable 
matching for d l  v : C -+ R+ then the shares kVc may be rationalized as coming from a 
Nash bargaining. 
Welfare maximization and Pareto optimal mechanisms. The agents are risk- 
neutral. On date 2, the members of each formed coalition C choose a utility profile 
(uy ) E R:' that maximizes the Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional 
max C W i ( u i ) .  
(uF)iec i ~ c  
subject to ui 5 v (C). The welfare components Wi, i E I, are increasing and 
concave. They are agent-specific, but not coalition-specific. 
Lensberg's (1987) results imply that payoffs (u?) are pairwise aligned.31 Indeed, 
x (C) = Wl (ui), for some i E C, determine a metaranking. Hence, we obtain the 
following. 
Corollary 6.3 (Sufficiency). If payoffs are determined by the maximization of a 
Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional, then there is a st able matching. 
Lensberg's (1987) results also suggest that all Pareto optimal and continuous choice 
rules that produce pairwise-aligned profiles may be interpreted as maximization of a 
Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional. His results cannot be directly applied 
in the present context, both because he considers a one-sided problem32 and because he 
~ e n s b e r ~  (1987) studies the consistency of solution concepts. Pairwise alignment of preference 
profiles is related to the consistency requirement as, in many environments, a consistent solution concept 
generates pairwise aligned preferences. The idea of consistency of solution concepts was introduced 
by Harsanyi (1959) in his analysis of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in Nash bargaining. 
Lensberg (1987,1988), Thomson (1988), Lensberg and Thomson (1989), Hart and Mas-Collel (1989), 
and Young (1994) analyzed consistency in the context of Nash bargaining, welfare functions, Walrasian 
trade, the Shapley value, and sharing rules. Thomson (2004) gives an up-to-date survey of these results. 
3 2 ~ o r  instance, Lensberg assumes that any collection of agents can form a coalition, while in many- 
to-one matching two firms cannot form a coalition. 
assumes pairwise alignment of preferences for a much larger space of applications of the 
choice rule than is available in our context. The appendix provides a simple proof of 
the following many-to-one result inspired by Lensberg (1 987). 
Proposition 6.4. Suppose that all firms are able to employ at least two workers. 
Suppose also that a post-matching mechanism G is non-discriminatory and monotonic, 
and the payoffs (G (2, C, v (C)))i,c are Pareto optimal in 
for all value functions v : C + R+. If the mechanism induces pairwise-aligned preference 
profiles, then there exist increasing strictly concave differentiable functions Wi : Ui -+ R 
for i E I such that Wi (0) = +m, and 
max z Wi (ui) - (G (2, C, (C)))itc = 
=,, 4Ev(0 itc 
This proposition,33 implies the following. 
Corollary 6.5 (Necessity). suppose that there are at least two firms and that 
all firms are able to employ at least two workers. Suppose also that a post-matching 
mechanism G is non-discriminatory and monotonic, and the payoffs (G (i, C, v (C)))i,c 
are Pareto optimal in 
for all value functions v : C + R+. If the mechanism induces preference profiles that ad- 
mit st able matchings, then there exist increasing strictly concave differentiable functions 
Wi : Ui - R for i E I such that Wi (0) = +m, and 
3 3 ~ o t h  in Proposition 6.4 and Corollary 6.5, it is enough to assume that agents' payoff are Pareto 
optimal in a subset V' (C) of the quasi-linear set V (C) as long as the Pareto frontier of each V' (C) is 
continuous in the value v (C) . 
Rent-seeking. On date 2, agents in each formed coalition C = {a l ,  ..., ak) engage 
in Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game over a prize v (C). Each ai E C will be able to 
lobby at cost ci to capture the prize v (C) with probability cl+7+er. Thus, if agents 
expand resources cl , . . . , ck then agent ai obtains in expectation 
ci 
v (C) - G. 
cl + .-• + ck 
The agents play the Nash equilibrium of this rent-seeking game; every agent lobbies at 
cost Fv (C) and has expected payoff 9. Theorem 4.5 applies and there is a stable 
matching in any matching problem with payoffs determined by the Tullock rent-seeking. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a novel sufficient condition for stability of matchings that may 
be used to study matching with complementarities and peer effects. The main com- 
ponent of this condition is the painvise alignment of preferences. The condition is 
particularly u3eful in the study of stability of matchings when preferences are induced 
by post-matching mechanisms. There exist stable and group stable matchings if a non- 
discriminatory mechanism generates pairwise aligned preferences. For monotonic, con- 
tinuous, and non-discriminatory mechanisms, pairwise alignment is also a necessary 
condition for stability. 
The sufficiency and necessity results allow one to determine which sharing rules or 
games induce the existence of stable matchings. There is always a stable matching 
if agents' preferences are induced by Nash bargaining or Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking 
game. The paper also applies the sufficiency and necessity results to (i) determine the 
class of linear sharing rules that always induce agents' preferences such that a stable 
matching exists, and (ii) determine the class of monotonic, non-discriminat ory, Pareto 
optimal mechanisms - such as welfare maximization - that induce the existence of stable 
mat chings . 
A natural direction to extend the results of the present paper would be to generalize 
them to the Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) model of matching with contracts. This 
model incorporates as special cases the college admission setting, in which agents have 
preferences over coalitions, the setting in which wages are determined during matching, 
and the ascending package auctions. Under certain ~ondi t ions ,~~ such an extension of 
the results of the present paper is possible if there are two categories of workers. The 
first category encompasses the workers, such as crucial researchers in a biotech R&D lab, 
with whom it is not possible to write contracts because of the inherent complexity of 
the relationship with these workers and incompleteness of the contractual environment. 
These workers might provide complementary inputs to the firm production process. 
The second category includes workers, such as lab assistants, with whom the firm may 
contract but whose inputs are substitutable. 
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Appendices to Sections 4, 5, and 6 
Appendix to Section 4. A Result on Non-Cooperative Implementation 
The following results show that if there is a metaranking then the non-cooperative 
implementations of matching will result in a group stable matching.35 Recall that in a 
game a profile of players' strategies a is in a Strong Nash Equilibrium if there does not 
exist a subset of players that can improve the payoffs of all its members by a coordinated 
deviation, while players not in the subset continue to play strategies from a.36 
Proposition 4.11. Consider a non-cooperative game between workers and firms 
that has the following properties 
(a) the game ends with a matching p, 
(b) the payoff of each agent i is determined by the coalition Cp (2) that the agent 
belongs to in the matching, and 
(c) for each coalition C, there is a profile of strategies of agents in C such that 
C' (2) = C for all i E C, irrespective of strategies of agents not in C. 
If agents' payoffs are such that there exists a metaranking of coalitions, then there 
is a Strong Nash Equilibrium of this game, all strong perfect equilibria correspond to 
J 5 ~ h e r e  is substantial empirical evidence that stability of matching is related to well functioning 
matching markets. The group stability by itself, however, is not a strategic concept. Roth and So- 
tornayor (1990) survey the theoretical results about manipulation of the matching process via misrep 
resentation of preferences. Sonmez (1997,1999) illustrates the theoretical problems with agents' trying 
to manipulate the matching process via capacity restrictions or pre-arranged matches. 
36 Cf. Aumann (1959), Rubinstein (1 980). We may alternatively use the solution concept of Coalition- 
Proof Nash Equilibrium of Bernheim, Peleg , Whinston (1987). 
group stable matchings, and any group stable matching corresponds to a strong perfect 
equilibrium. 
An example of a game satisfying conditions (a)-(c) is the Gale and Shapley (1962) 
deferred acceptance algorithm. Another example is a game in which each worker applies 
for one or no jobs, and then each firm selects its workforce from among its applicants. 
Proof. The proof or Theorem 2 . 1 ~ ~  shows that there is a group stable matching. 
Let us first show that any group stable matching is implementable as a Strong Nash 
Equilibrium of the game, and then show that each Strong Nash Equilibrium results in 
a group stable matching. 
Consider a group stable matching. Let {Cl, . . . , Ck) be the corresponding coalition 
structure. One of the coalitions, Cil , is a maximal coalition in the met aranking, another 
coalition, Ci2, is a maximal coalition among coalitions of agents from W U F - Cil , and 
we can recursively find coalitions Ci, , . .., Ci, in this way. By (c), there is a profile of 
strategies of agents from Ci that enforces the formation of Cia These profiles are in a 
Strong, Nash Equilibrium. 
For the remaining implication, consider a Strong Nash Equilibrium and the resulting 
matchirig ' with corresponding coalition structure {Cl , . . . , Ci). Notice that there is a 
coalition Ci, that is maximal in the metaranking. Indeed, otherwise the assumption (c) 
would imply that the members of Ci, would have a coordinated profitable deviation in 
the game. Recursively, we can find a coalition Ci2 that is maximal among coalitions of 
agents &om W U F - Cl, and so on. An inspection of these coalitions show that the 
matching is group stable. This completes the proof. 
Appendix to Section 5. 
A counterexample showing that the class of rich domains is larger than 
its utility counterpart (cf. the footnote to the definition of the rich domain). 
Let ui (C) denotes agent i's utility from joining coalition C, and UI the profile of 
utilities of agents i E I. We may express a utility counterpart of the rich domain 
condition as follows. 
For any w E W, C, C' E Ci, #C, #C' 2 3, and any UI E P there exists u; E P such 
that 
3 7 ~ h e  claim is also proved in a stronger form of Proposition 5.5. 
u; (C) = u; (C') . 
u: (c) = uj (c) for all j E I and C E C - {C). 
The following counterexample will show that there are rich domains of preference 
profiles that are not representable by ordinary utilities that satisfy the above utility 
counterpart of richness. 
Consider a firm f and three workers wl, w2, w3. Let P be a domain of preference 
profiles consisting of the following three subdomains. 
The f is t  subdomain of profiles contains all profiles 5: with the following properties 
The second subdomain of profiles contains all profiles 5; with the following prop- 
ert ies 
The third subdomain of profiles contains all profiles 5; with the following prop- 
erties 
This domain of preference profiles is rich and it is not possible to represent the 
preferences by ordinary utilities that satisfy the utility counterpart of richness. Indeed, 
assume that each profile in P is represented by a utility profile UI and that the resultant 
domain of utility profiles satisfies the above utility counterpart of richness. Take a 
utility profile u: representing a preference profile from the first subdomain with minimal 
1 uWl ({ f ,  w,, w3)) Find a utility profile u; identical with u: except on { f ,  wl, w2) and 
such that ui2 ({ f ,  w1, ~ 2 ) )  = u:2 ({ f ,  w2, ~ 3 ) ) .  Then, find a profile u; identical with u: 
except on { f ,  w2, w3) and such that ui3 ({ f ,  w2, w3)) = ui3 ({ f ,  wl , w3))  Finally, notice 
that there cannot exist a profile uj identical with u; except on {f, wl, w3) and such that 
ukl ({ f ,  w1, w3)) = uil  ({ f ,  w1, ~ 2 ) ) .  Indeed, such a profile would have to represent a 
preference profile from the first subdomain. However, 
contradicting the selection of ui SO that u& ({ f , wl , w3}) is minimal. This completes 
the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. This theorem follows from Theorem 5.8 proved next. 
A lemma for the proof of Theorem 5.8. Let us precede the proof of Theorem 
5.8 with a preparatory lemma. 
. 
Lemma 5.8.1. Let the profile belong to a rich domain R of pairwisealigned 
preference profiIes. Assume that there are no blocking one-worker firms. Then there are 
no cycles of three coalitions Cl,z, C2,3, C3,1 E C such that 
(a) there is an agent ai E Ci-lj n Ci,i+l, 
(b) C3,1 ka3 C2,3 ka2 C1,2 kal C3,i with at least one strict preference . 
Proof. For an indirect proof, assume that there are coalitions Cl12, C2,~,  C3,~ E C such 
that 
(a) there is an agent ai E Ci-l,i n Ci,i+1, 
(b) C3,i ka3 C2,3 ka2 C1,2 kal C3,1 with at least one strict preference. 
Consider the following four cases 
Case 1: al, a2, a3 E F. Then a1 = a2 = a3 is a firm whose preferences are circular. 
Case 2: a l ,a2  E F ,a3  E W. Then al = a2 and we can shorten the cycle t o m  = 2, 
and use the argument from the discussion in Section 5 .  
Case 3: a3 E F, a l ,  a2 E W. The case of firm a3 able to employ two workers was 
discussed in Section 5. If a3 is able to employ at most one worker, then C3,i = {al, as) 
and C2,3 = {a2, a3) and the result follows from the lack of blocking one-worker firms. 
(Notabene, this is the only place in the proof that uses the lack of blocking oneworker 
firms). 
Case 4: a l ,  a2, a3 E W .  Then, either ai = ai+l for some i = 1,2,3 and the pairwise 
alignment directly proves the claim, or all ai are different and each Ck,k+l has three 
members and contains a firm able to employ two workers. Take a firm fo E F able to 
employ two workers; then {a l ,  fo,  a2) , (02, fo ,  a3) , {as, fo ,  a1) E C. 
If C1,2 = {al ,  fo ,  02) then 
C1,2 -a1 {a1 , fo ,  a2) ; 
if ClY2 # {a2, fo ,  as )  then use the rich domain assumption to find Z I  such that the above 
indifference is true and all preferences not involving {a2,  fo ,  as)  are preserved. Abusing 
notation, we will continue to denote the new preference profile by zI. Similarly, if 
c1, = {a,, fo ,  a3) then 
C I , ~  -a2 {a2, f0,  a3) ; 
if CIZ + {a2, f0,a3) then use the rich domain assumption to find Z I  such that the 
above indifference is true and all preferences not involving {a2, fo,  a s )  are preserved. If 
{a27 f 0 7  a3) w f o  {a l ,  fo ,  a2), then 
contrary to what we proved in Case 3. Thus 
{a27 fo ,  03) - to  {al ,  fo,  02) . 
Now, if C2,3 = {a3, f O ,  a l )  then 
if C2,3 f {a3, fO,al )  then use the rich domain assumption to find 51 such that the 
above indifference is true and all preferences not involving {a3, fo ,  a l )  are preserved. 
Then C2,3 Fa2 C1,2 {a27 f0 ,  a3) and 
{a27 fo ,  a3) 4 f o  {a37 f o ,  a l l  - 
contrary to what we proved in Case 3. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorems 5.8. For an indirect proof, assume that zI does not admit a 
stable matching. In particular, a relaxed metaranking does not exist. By Lemma 5.4, 
the lack of a relaxed metaranking means that there exists a blocking cycle of coalitions 
C12, C23.. , Cml E C for some m 2 2 such that 
(a) There exists ai E Ci-l,i n Ci,i+l for i = 1, ..., m and Ci-l,i Zai 
(b) For at least one i the preference is strict Ci-l,i CiYi+l and at least one of 
Ci-l,i, Ciyi+l has three or more members. 
We will proceed by induction. Notice that the case m = 2 follows directly from the 
pairwise alignment, and the case m = 3 follows from Lemma 5.8.1. For an inductive 
step, fix m 2 4, and assume that there are no blocking cycles of strictly fewer than m 
coalit ions. 
Step 1. First let us demonstrate that there exists k such that 
Ck,k+l has three or more members, and 
ak+l, ak+3 or ak,ak-2 are workers. 
To prove this claim take Ci,i+l with three or more members and consider two cases. 
Case 1: either ai or ai+l is a worker or both are. By symmetry we can assume that 
ai+l is a worker. If ai+3 is also a worker then the claim is proved, so assume 
that ai+3 is a firm. If ai+2 or ai+4 is a firm, then it is the same firm as ai+3. 
Then however, there would exist a blocking cycle of m - 1 coalitions, either 
C I , ~ ,  .--, Ci+l,i+2, Ci+3,i+4r Cm,l Or C1,2, . - . r  Ci+3,i+3r Ci+4,i+5, - - - 7  Cm,l, contray to 
the inductive assumption. So, assume that both ai+2 and ai+4 are workers. If 
ai+l = ai+2 then again there would be a blocking cycle of m - 1 coalitions contrary 
to the inductive assumption. Finally, if ai+l # ai+2 then Ci+l,i+2 contains two 
workers and hence #Ci+l,i+2 2 3, ai+2 and ai+4 are workers, and hence the claim 
is true. 
Case 2: both ai and ai+l are firms. Then in fact ai = ai+l. Look at ai-1 and ai+2. If 
one of them is a firm, then it is the same firm as ai = ai+l, and we could shorten 
the cycle, contrary to the inductive assumption. So, assume that ai-1 and ai+2 are 
workers. Notice that ai is able to employ two workers because #Ci,i+1 2 3 and 
consider two subcases depending on whether {ai- ai , ai+2) is identical to one of 
Cj,j+l. 
a If { ~ i - ~ ,  ai  ai+2} = Cj,j+l, then either at least one agent aj,aj+l is a worker, and 
we can reduce the problem to Case 1, or both a j  and aj+l are firms. If a j  and 
aj+l are firms then a j  = aj+l = ai, and hence we can without loss of generality 
assume that Ci,i+l = (ai-1, ai, ai+2}. The pairwise alignment then implies that 
Ci-1,i ;jai-l Ci,ifl or Ci-l,i 4 a i - l  Ci,i+1 depending on whether Ci-lli 4 ,  Ci,i+l. 
Thus, we can substitute ai-1 for ai to form the blocking cycle 
with at least one strict preference, and reduce the problem to Case 1. 
a If {ai-l, ai, ai+2} # Cjj+1 for all j = 1, ..., rn, then we can use the rich domain 
assumption to find a preference profile such that ai , ai+2} Ci,i+1 and all 
preferences on the blocking cycle are preserved. Since ai = ai+l, we can replace 
Ci,i+l with {ai-i, ai, ai+2}, and argue as above. This completes the proof of the 
claim. 
In view of the above claim, and the symmetry of the problem, we can assume that 
a1 and a3 are workers and CmV1 has three or more members. Set C = {al, as, f}  where 
f is a firm that can employ two workers (such a firm exists if there exists a blocking 
cycle). 
Step 2. First consider the case when C = Ci,i+l, for some i = 1, ..., rn. Look at 
C2,3, C and conclude from Lemma 5.8.1 that either C1,2 +,, C, or C2,3 Fa3 C, or 
C Nal  C1,2 "a;! C2,3 ,a3 C- 
If C = Ci,i+1 and C1,2 C then i # 1 and the shorter cycle 
satisfies (a) and (b) because Cmll Za, ClY2 +,, C = Ci,i+1 and # (C) 2 3. This is 
impossible, however, by the inductive assumption. 
If C = Ci,i+l and C2,3 C then i # 2 and the shorter cycle 
satisfies (a) and (b) because C 4 ,  C2,~ zag C3,4 and # (C) 2 3. Again, this is 
impossible by the inductive assumption. 
a If C wal C1,2 Na2 c2,3 wa3 C then the cycle C, C3,4..., Cm,1 is blocking contrary to 
the inductive assumption. 
Step 3. Finally consider the case C # Ci,i+l for all 2. Because # (Cm,l) 2 3, we 
can use the rich domain assumption to find a pairwise-aligned preference profile Z I  such 
that there are no blocking one-worker firms, and all preferences along the blocking cycle 
are preserved and C Nal Cmyl. Abusing notation let us refer to the new profile as zI. 
Consider two subcases depending on preference of a3 between C and C2,3. 
a If C 4 ,  C2,3, then consider the collection of m - 1 coalitions C, C3,4, C4,5, . . . , Cm,1. 
This is a blocking cycle of length m- 1 because C 4 ,  C2,3 Za3 C3,4 and # (C) 2 3. 
a If C ka3 C2,3, then consider the collection of three coalitions Clg2, C2,3, C. Since 
C Cm,l , we have C Zal C1,2. Thus the collection Cl , C2, C satisfies 
By Lemma 5.8.1 all agents are then indifferent. But then C, C3,4..., Cm,l is a 
blocking cycle of m - 1 coalitions, contrary to the inductive assumption. This 
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5.9(b). It is enough to show that for any w E W and any 
C, C' 3 w such that #C, #C1 2 3; if a profile Z I  admits a relaxed metaranking then 
there exists a profile 5; that admits a relaxed metaranking, agrees with zI except for 
coalition C, and satisfies C C; @. Denote by =$ the relaxed metaranking of zI and fix 
C, C and w. Consider 5; that agrees with zI except for coalition C. Furthermore, for 
any j E C and any coalition CN 3 j, set C zj CC" iff C' 4 C" and CN zj C iff C" 4 @. 
Now, consider the candidate relaxed metaranking 4' identical to 4 except on C, and 
such that C 4' C iff C' 4' CN, and C' 4' C iff CN 4' C'. 
Notice that 4' is transitive. To verify that 4' is indeed a relaxed metaranking, it 
is enough to verify conditions (1) and (2) defining the relaxed metaranking in case of 
comparisons of C and some other coalition C". 
Condition (1) is satisfied because C 2; C'' means that C 4 CN, and hence C 4' C". 
A similar argument works for C" 5; C. 
Condition (2) is satisfied for C, irrespective of whether C or C has three or more 
members. Indeed, if C 4' C" and the claim of the implication is false, that is, C >-> C", 
then C' > C"; and thus C 9 Cn, which would be a contradiction. A similar argument 
works for C" 6' C .  This completes the proof. 
A lemma for the proof of Theorem 5.10. Let us precede the proof of Theorem 
5.10 with a preparatory lemma. 
Lemma 5.10.1. Fix preference profile 51. If there are no cycles of coalitions 
Clz7 C23-..7 Cml E C for any m 2 2 such that 
(a)  there exists ai E Ci-17i n Ci,i+l for i = 1, ..., m and Ci-lli 5 ,  
(b) at least one preference is strict Ci-ls +ai Cili+l, 
then Z I  admits a metaranking. 
Proof. Define relation =$ so that C =$ C whenever there exists a sequence of coalitions 
E C' such that 
* = C172, 
* Ct = Cm7m+1, 
* there is an agent ai E Ci-l,i fI Ci7i+l such that Ci--lPi 4 ,  Ci7i+l. 
This is a transitive relation on coalitions, and it is straightforward to verify that this 
relation is a metaranking. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 5.10. For an indirect proof, assume that does not admit 
a metaranking. By Lemma 5.10.1 this means that there exists a cycle of coalitions 
CI2, C23..., Cmll E C for some m 2 2 such that 
(a)  There exists ai E Ci-lli n Cis+l for i = 1, ..., m and Ci-lli Zai Ci,i+l. 
(b) At least one preference is strict Ci-17i +ai Cis+l. 
We will proceed by induction. The case rn = 2 follows directly from the pairwise 
alignment. The case m = 3 was proved in Lemma 5.8.1. For an inductive step fix m 2 4 
and assume that the claim is true for all collections of strictly fewer than m coalitions. 
As a preparatory step, let us demonstrate that there exists a k  and ak+2  that are 
both workers. Indeed, first notice that if both ai and ai+l are firms, then ai = ai+l and 
we can shorten the cycle and invoke the inductive assumption to find a contradiction. 
Hence, there exists ai who is a worker. If now ai+2 is a firm, then both ai+l and ai+3 
are workers, or we can shorten the cycle and invoke the inductive assumption. Without 
loss of generality assume that a1 and a3 are workers. Take a firm f able to employ two 
or more workers, and set C = {a1 , a3, f ). 
First, consider the case when C = Ci,i+1, for some i E ( 1 ,  . . . , m) . Look at C1,2, C2,3, C 
and conclude from Lemma 5.8.1 that either ClY2 +,, C ,  or C2,3 *a3 C ,  or C mal C1,2 
C2,3 -a3 c- 
If C = Ci,i+1 and C1,2 +,, C then i # 1 and then the shorter cycle 
satisfies conditions (a) and (b) contrary to the inductive assumption. If C = Ci,i+l and 
C2,3 +a3 C then i # 2 and the shorter cycle 
satisfies conditions (a) and (b) contrary to the inductive assumption. Finally, if C mal 
C1,2 ma2 C2,3 ma3 C then the shorter cycle C, C3,4. . , Cm,1 satisfies conditions (a)-(b), 
contrary to the inductive assumption. 
Finally, consider the remaining case C # Ci,i+l for all i. Use the assumption on 
the domain from the theorem to find a pairwise aligned profile $ I  such that there are 
no blocking one-worker firms, and C Nal Cm,1 and all preferences along the cycle are 
preserved. Let us refer to the new profile as zr. Consider two cases depending on the 
preference of a3 between C and C2,3. 
If C 4 ,  C2,3, then the collection of m - 1 coalitions C, C3,4, C4,5, ..., Cm,1 satisfies 
(a)-(b) since C +, C2,3 zag C3,4, and we can invoke the inductive assumption. 
If C ka3 C2,3, then consider the collection of three coalitions ClY2, C2,3,C. Since 
C mal CmY1, we have C za, C1,2. Thus the collection Cl , C2, C satisfies 
By Lemma 5.8.1 all agents are then indifferent. But then C, C3,4.. . , Cm,l satisfies (a) 
and (b) and consists of m - 1 coalitions, contrary to the inductive assumption. This 
completes the proof. 
Lemmas for the proof of Theorem 5.12. Let us precede the proof of Theorem 
5.12 with two lemmas. 
Lemma 5.12.1. Assume that a domain R of preference profiles satisfies the condi- 
tions (2)- (3) of Theorem 5.12 and that all profiles in R admit stable matchings. Assume 
that Cly2, . .. , C3,i, a1 , . . . , a3 are such that {ai ) C Ci-1,i n Ci,i+1 (all subscripts modulo 3)) 
and that 
(a) if ai E W then {ai) = Ci-l,i n Ci,i+l, and 
(b) if ai E F then Ci,i+l = {ai) U S U {ai+i) for some S C Ci-l,i. 
Then, if C3,1 -al G,i, and Ci J -a2 C2,3) then C2,3 ?a3 C3,1m 
Proof. For an indirect proof assume that there exists a cycle ClT2, . .. , C3,i that satisfies 
(a)) (b), aXld C3,l -al C1,2r C1,2 -a2 C2,3r and C2,3 +as C3,l. 
Use (3) with C = C2,3 and i = a2 to find a preference profile z I ~  R such that 
C3,~ C1,2, C1,2 +a2 C2,3, and Cze +a3 C3,i (we continue to denote the new profile 
by the same symbol). Then, use (3) with C = C1,2 and i = a1 to find $I  such that 
C3,l +al C1,2, C1,2 +a2 C2,37 and C2,3 4 0 3  C3,l- 
Then, for all i E ClYz U ... U C3,1r and C 3 i different fiom C1,2, C2,3, C3,1, use (2) to 
find zi€ R such that C zi CkVk+i for k = 1, . . ., 3. Use (3) to find zr E R such that 
C +i Ck,kfl for k = 1, ..., 3 and all i E I, and C 3 i different from CIy2, C2,3, C3,i. 
Recursively for i = 1,2,3, use (2) to modify the preference profile - while preserving 
all the above mentioned strict preferences - so that there exists a sequence of subsets 
for some mi E {1,2, ...) such that 
Cti+l = {fi) for some fi E F7 
c:,+:~ = u {a ! )  for some a! E W, 
, and 
C 5, c&+, for any a E c&+, and C 3 a  different from c:c1, . . . , c~:+;~, C1,2, C2,3, C3,1, 
mi-1 cri7 - - * ,  ciWl,i 
Use (3) to modify the preferences and strengthen the last two of the above properties: 
mi-1 C +, C&+, for any a E Ctifl and C 3 a different from c:?~, ..., Ci,i+, , C I , ~ ,  C2,3, C3,1, 
while maintaining the preferences C3,1 +al C1,2 +a2 C2,3 +a3 C3,1 ,and C +a Ci,i+lf~r all 
a E C n Gi+,- 
The resultant profile of preferences does not admit a stable matching. This completes 
the proof. 
Lemma 5.12.2. Suppose that there are at least two firms able to employ two or 
more workers each. Let R be a rich domain of preference profiles. Assume that each 
profile Z r E  R satisfies the claim of Lemma 5.12.1: for every cycle ClV2, ..., C3,i, al, ..., a3 
such that {ai) C_ Ci-,,i n Ci++l and the conditions (a) and (b) are true we have 
Then, if A, B E C, B c A, # (A - B) = 1, and a, b E B, then A ma B implies A mb B. 
Proof. Take A, B E C such that B c A, # (A - B) = 1, .md take a, b E B. If a = b 
then the claimis true. If a $: b, then #B > 2 and #A 2 3 .  Moreover, thep A n B 
contains a firm that can hire two or more workers. Consider three cases. 
Case 1: a, b E W .  
There are at least two firms, so there exists c E F - A - B. Consider the cycle 
A, {b,c), {a, c). Change zr so that {a, c) ma A and {b, c) ~b A while preferences 
between coalitions different than {b, c )  , {a, c) are preserved. Let us denote the new 
profile by zr Then, Lemma 5.12.1 implies that {a, c) mC {b, c). If B ma A then B 
{a, c) , and Lemma 5.12.1 applied to the cycle B , {a, c) , {b, c) implies that B ~b {b, C) . 
Hence, B ~b A. 
Case2: a €  F , b € W .  
Take c E A - B c W and f E F2 - {a); f exists since there are at least two firms 
able to employ two or more workers each. Let 
C = A - {b) = B - {b) U {c) 
and 
C' = {b, c, f )  . 
We will repeat the Case 1 argument with some modifications. Note that C n C  = {c) and 
A n  C' = {b) , so condition (a) is satisfied for the cycle C, C', A and all its permutations. 
hloreover, firm a E A n C,  and both A - C and C - A are singletons or empty. Hence 
also condition (b) is satisfied. Similar relations are true for the cycle C, C', B and all 
its permutations. Thus, the claim of Lemma 5.12.1 is satisfied for cycles C, C', A and 
C, C', B. 
Using the rich domain assumption, we can find a preference profile that preserves 
preferences between coalitions other than C' and such that 
Using the rich domain assumption again, we can find a profile that preserves preferences 
between coalitions other than C and such that 
C -, C'. 
Now, Lemma 5.12.1 implies that C -, A. 
Since A ma B was preserved in the above changes of the preference profile, we have 
Furthermore, c is indifferent between C and C'. Thus, Lemma 5.12.1 applied to B, C, C' 
gives 
C' -0 B. 
Since b was also shown to be indifferent between C and A, we have B -0 A as required. 
Case3: a E W , ~ E  F .  
After renaming the agents, we can assume that a E F, b E W and A B,  and use 
virtually the same argument as in Case 2. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 5.12. If there are no firms able to employ two or more workers 
each, then all preference profiles are consistent and there are no blocking one-worker 
firms. 
If there are at least two firms able to employ two or more workers each, then apply 
Lemmas 5.12.1 and 5.12.2 to show that for all i, j E C, C' E C , all profiles satisfy the 
condition 
C N ~  C' + C N j  C1- 
Remark 5.13 then shows that all profiles are pairwise aligned. The lack of blocking 
one-worker firms follows directly from Lemma 5.12.1. This completes the proof. 
Appendix to Section 6 
Proof Proposition 6.4. The proof of Proposition 4.7 for monotonic mechanisms, 
presented in Section 4, constructs the payoff translation functions tb,, : Ua -+ Ub for any 
agents a, b such that one of them is a worker. Recall that for each coalition C 3 a, b, we 
have 
tb,a (G (a7 C, V)) = G (b) C) V) . 
By the monotonicity of mechanism G, functions tb,a are strictly increasing. Since G 
generates Pareto optimal profiles, functions tb,a are continuous. 
Choose an arbitrary reference worker w*, notice that 0 E Uw*, and define 
where f : Uw. -+ R is decreasing, f (s) -+ +oo as s --+ 0+, and such that all are 
right hand side integrable at 0. Notice that there exists a function f that satisfies these 
conditions. Indeed, there is a finite number k of functions t,.,, which are all continuous, 
increasing, and have value 0 at 0. Take 
tmin - 
- min {tw*,a} 
a 
and notice that it is also continuous and increasing, and has value 0 at 0. The functions 
11, are integrable if f o smln is. This will be so if, for example, 
Moreover, f is decreasing (since smin is increasing), and f ( s )  -+ +co as s -+ O+ (because 
smin (t) t 0 as t t 0). Notice that ga are positive and strictly decreasing and define, 
Now, Wa are concave and increasing. 
It remains to be shown that the solution to 
run 
coincides with G (a, C, V) . Concavity of the problem implies that there is a solution. 
Since the slope at 0 for each SoUa $a (7) dr is infinite, so the solution is internal. The 
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differentiability of the objective function implies that the internal solution is given by 
the first order Lagrange conditions 
and the possibility constraint (ca) I a E c  E V .  The fist  order condition can be rewritten 
as 
tw* ,a ( c a )  = f ( A )  
or 
fia = t , w *  (f -' ( A ) )  
If there is no worker in C, then C = { f) for some f E F and the claim we are proving 
is true. Otherwise, fix a worker w E C and notice that for agents a E C 
Lemma 5.8.1 from the appendix to section 5 shows that 
Hence, 
G (a ,  c, V )  = ta,w* ( tw*,w (G (a, C, V ) ) )  = t , w *  (2) 
for some x E R. 
This equation, the analogous equation for iia above, the monotonicity of ta,,* , the 
Pareto optimality of the mechanism, and the possibility constraint (ii,) I a E c  E V imply 
.that 
iia = G (a,C,V) .
This completes the proof. 

Chapter 2. Bargaining and Coalition Formation 
1. Introduction 
This paper studies games of coalition formation whose outcome is a coalition struc- 
ture defined as a partition of the set of agents into coalitions. All the agents have 
preferences over the coalitions they can join.' The paper focuses on situations in which 
agents first form coalitions and then each coalition realizes a payoff profile from the set 
of available alternatives. Examples of such situations include the formation of clubs (cf. 
Buchanan 1965), partnerships (Farrell and Scotchmer 1988), firms and business alliances 
(Hart and Moore 1990), and jurisdictions voting on public goods (Jehiel and Scotchmer 
2001) .2 
A major challenge in modelling coalition formation is that the core3 - the standard 
solution concept employed to study games of coalition formation - may be empty. In 
effect, the models of coalition formation rely on structural restrictions to ensure that 
there are core coalition structures. For example, Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) assume 
that the value created by a partnership is divided equally among partners. Hart and 
Moore (1990) assume that the coalition value depends on investments made by coalition 
members before they formed the coalition, that the investments are complementary at 
the margin, that the marginal return on investment is positively correlated with the total 
return, and that the total return is divided in Shapley bargaining within the ~oalition.~ 
This paper addresses this challenge. It provides a sufficient and, in a certain sense, 
necessary condition for the existence of core coalition structures, and it provides a suf- 
ficient condition for the uniqueness of the core coalition structure. The conditions are 
satisfied in several bargaining settings that have not previously been recognized as ad- 
mitting core coalition structures. 
' ~ o ~ o m o l n a i a  and Jackson (2002) and Banerjee, Konishi and Sonmez (2001) use the term hedonic 
games of coalition formation to refer to such games. Drhze and Greenberg (1980) use the term hedonic 
to refer to the dependence of an agent's utility on who else belongs to his or her coalition. 
2~ehie l  and Scotchmer (2001) assume that there is a continuum of agents, while this paper focuses 
on the case of a finite number of agents. There are also coalition formation games with special structure 
such as the one-to-one and many-to-one matching studied by Gale and Shapley (1962) and surveyed 
by Roth and Sotomayor (1990). 
% coalition structure is in the core if there does not exist a counterfactual coalition whose members 
strictly prefer it to their coalitions in the coalition structure. 
4Hart and Moore (1990) also assume that the coalitional value is superadditive in coalition members 
and their assets. 
The main component of the proposed condition is the pairwise alignment of prefer- 
ences on proper  coalition^.^ Agents' preferences are pairwise aligned on proper coalitions 
if any two agents in the intersection of any two proper coalitions prefer the same one of 
the two coalitions. This condition is satisfied if agents7 payoffs are determined in Nash 
bargaining. It is also satisfied if the payoffs are determined according to some other 
consistent solution concepts such as the egalitarian and Rawlsian division rules, and 
Tullock (1980) rent-seeking game. 
However, the pairwise alignment of a single preference profile does not guarantee 
that the core is non-empty. For instance, in a roommate problem agents match in pairs 
and any two agents may form a pair. Preferences are always pairwise aligned, but the 
existence of a stable coalition structure is not a~sured .~  
Because of the problem illustrated by the above example, the main results of the 
paper rely on the pairwise alignment properties of the mechanism used to determine 
the payoffs and not only on the pairwise alignment of a single profile of payoffs. Recall 
that agents first form coalitions (on date 1) and then (on date 2) each coalition chooses 
a profile of payoffs from the set of available alternatives. On date 1, the agents cannot 
negotiate binding contracts. Thus, their preferences over coalitions result from their 
expectations of the payoffs that will be determined or, date 2. On date 2, each coalition 
creates and divides a coalitional value, playing a game, using a bargaining solution, a di- 
vision rule, or another mechanism. This mechanism determines the agents' payoffs. The 
mechanism is pairwise aligned on proper coalitions if the mechanism generates agents' 
preferences that are pairwise aligned on proper coalitions for all coalitional values. The 
paper imposes some mild regularity assumptions on the mechanisms studied. 
The paper's main results are as follows. It is sufficient for the existence of a core 
coalition structure that the mechanism is pairwise aligned on proper coalitions. For 
any mechanism that does not satisfy this property there exists a superadditive value 
function for which the mechanism generates a coalition formation problem with empty 
core. Thus, the pairwise alignment of the mechanism is necessary for the existence of 
a core coalition structure for all value functions. Moreover, the core coalition structure 
is generically unique if the mechanism generates agents' preferences that are pairwise 
aligned on all coalitions for all coalitional values. 
The above sufficiency and necessity results allow one to determine which sharing rules 
and games induce the existence of core coalition structures. For instance, Section 5 shows 
5 A  coalition is called proper if there is an agent that does not belong to the coalition. 
'Cf. Example 3.2. 
that there is always a generically unique core coalition structure if agents' preferences 
are induced by Nash bargaining, egalitarian or Rawlsian solutions, or Tullock's (1980) 
rent-seeking game. In addition, this section shows that using the Kalai-Smorodinsky or 
Shapley bargaining solutions to divide the payoffs may result in an empty core. Section 
6 relates the pairwise alignment condition to the literature on consistency of solution 
concepts. Section 7 determines the class of linear sharing rules and the class of welfare 
maximization mechanisms that induce the existence of core coalition structures. 
The idea of using pairwise alignment to study the core seems to be new. As noted 
above, Farrell and Scotchmer's (1988) study of the formation of partnerships shows 
that the core is non-empty in a coalition formation game followed by an equal division 
of value. Banerjee, Konishi, and Sonmez (2001) note that the equal division may be 
replaced by some other linear sharing rules in Farrell and Scotchrner's analysis. In a 
companion paper, Pycia (2005) studies stability of many-to-one matching and shows 
that the pairwise alignment of preferences generated by a post-matching mechanism is 
crucial for the existence of stable matchings. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents 
examples. Section 4 presents the main results. Sections 5, 6, and 7 apply the results to 
determine which mechanisms generate a non-empty core. The last section concludes. 
2. Model 
There is a finite set of agents I. A coalition structure S is a partition of I. That 
is in a coalition structure S, each agent a E I belongs to exactly one coalition S (a) E 
C = 2' - (0). Each agent a E I has a preference relation 5, over all coalitions C that 
contain a.7 
Each agent i E I has a preference relation zi over all coalitions that contain i. 
The profile of preferences (zi)iGI is denoted by zI. This formulation embodies the 
assumption that each agent a is indifferent between any two coalition structures with 
same S (a). 
Agents' preferences among coalitions reflect agents' payoffs obtained in a game played 
after the coalitions are formed. More precisely, the payoffs are determined in the fol- 
lowing way. There are two dates. On date 1, agents form coalitions. On this date, the 
7That is each agent a is indifferent between any two coalition structures with same S (a) .  
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agents cannot negotiate binding contracts. Consequently, the agents form their prefer- 
ences by foreseeing what will happen on date 2. On date 2, agents in each resultant 
coalition play a game that determines individual payoffs. 
We are interested in the non-emptiness of the core in the above environment. 
Definition 2.1 (Core). A coalition structure S is blocked by a coalition C if 
C +, S (a) for all a E C. A coalition structure is in the core if it is not blocked by any 
coalition. 
Each coalition C f I is called proper and each coalition structure S f {I) is called 
proper or non-trivial. 
3. Examples 
Let us start with an example first studied in Farrell and Scotchmer's (1988) analysis 
of partnerships that divide surplus equally. 
Example 3.1. During coalition formation, the agents from set I of agents cannot 
negotiate binding contracts. The agents' preferences over coalit ions are determined by 
date 2 payoffs. At date 2, each coalition C that formed creates value v (C)  2 0 and 
shares it equally among its members. 
In this example, the core is non-empty. Indeed, to construct a core coalition struc- 
ture, take a coalition Cl C I that maximizes per member value 
add a coalition C2 I - Cl that maximizes 
and recursively repeat this process until all agents are assigned to a coalition. The 
resulting coalition structure is in the core. 
A question arises what characteristics of the equal division rule lead to the non- 
emptiness of the core? The answer to this question provided in this paper relies on the 
notion of pairwise alignment of preferences. Preferences are paznuise alzgned if for all 
agents i, j and coalitions C, C 3 i, j , we have 
Preferences generated by the equal division rule are pairwise aligned. Section 6 
studies other value sharing mechanisms that generate pairwise aligned preferences such 
as the Nash bargaining. 
The pairwise alignment of a preference profile is not sufficient to guarantee non- 
emptiness of the core as illustrated by the following. 
Example 3.2. Consider the coalition formation problem with three agents a1 , az, as. 
Assume that each agent prefers to be in a coalition with one other agent to being alone, 
and prefers being alone to the grand coalition. Then, the preferences are pairwise 
aligned. However, if 
then the core is empty. 
The next two sections will show how pairwise alignment as a property of ex post 
game is sufficient, and in a certain sense necessary, condition for non-emptiness of the 
core. 
4. Mechanisms and Coalition Formation 
The basic structure of the matching problems studied in this section is similar to 
Example 1 of Section 3. The structure is as follows. There are two dates. On date 
1, agents form coalitions. On this date, the agents cannot negotiate binding contracts. 
Consequently, the agents form their preferences by foreseeing what will happen on date 
2. On date 2, each resultant coalition C realizes a payoff profile from the set of feasible 
payoffs 
f \ 
where v (C) is the value of coalition C and v : C -t R+ is the value function. We 
allow the payoffs ui to represent expected payoffs from lotteries over a larger space of 
outcomes. Coalition C realizes a feasible payoff profile by playing some game, following 
some bargaining protocol, or using some sharing rule. For instance, in the example 
of Section 3, the payoff profile was chosen via equal division. Other examples - such 
as Nash bargaining, Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game, and linear sharing rules - are 
discussed in Section 6. 
A post-matching mechanism (or, mechanism) is a game or a choice rule that players 
use to decide which profile of payoffs will be realized. The following definition of a post- 
matching mechanism identifies each such game or rule with resulting agents' payoffs 
because ultimately the stability properties of any matching problem are determined by 
these payoffs alone. 
Definition 4.1 (Mechanism). A post-matching mechanism is a function G that 
for every coalition C and value v (C) determines nonnegative payoffs G (i, C, v (C)) for 
all members i E C so that 
For example, an equal division rule operating on a coalition C with value v (C) 
produces payoffs G (i, C, v (C)) = g. 
This section discusses mechanisms that are regular in the following sense 
Definition 4.2 (Regularity). A mechanism G is regular if for any agent i and 
proper coalition C 3 i 
a G has full range: {G (i, C, v (C) ) : v (C) 2 0) = [0, oo) 
a G is monotonic: G (i, C, G) is increasing in G 2 0 
a G is continuous: G (i, C, G) is continuous in G 2 0 
For example, the equal division rule is regular. Also, Nash bargaining, Tullock's 
rent-seeking, and linear sharing rules discussed in Section 6 are regular.8 
8A mechanism that chooses payoffs ( u ~ ) ~ , ~  that maximize a welfare functional xiEc Wi (ui) has 
full range if the welfare components Wi satisfy an Inada type condition W: (u) -+ 0 as u + W. If this 
condition fails, the welfare maximization mechanism may fail the full range condition, for instance, if 
W{ (u) and W; (u) tend to 0 as u --+ but W$ (u) > 1 for all u. 
This section provides a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of stable 
matchings for all preference profiles induced by a regular mechanism. These conditions 
build on the notion of pairwise aligned preferences. Recall that preferences are pairwise 
aligned on proper coalitions if all agents in an intersection of any two proper coalitions 
prefer the same coalition of the two. 
Definition 4.3 (Pairwise Alignment). Preferences are pairwise alzgned on proper 
coalitions if for all agents i, j and proper coalitions C, C' 3 i, j, we have 
In particular, then C mi C iff C mj C', and C > i  C iff C > j  C1. Preferences 
generated by the equal division rule of Example 3.1 are pairwise aligned. 
The sufficient and necessary condition for stability is given by the following. 
Theorem 4.4 (Sufficiency and Necessity). Assume that there are at least 
four agents. A regular post-matching mechanism induces preference profiles that are 
pairwiscaligned on proper coalitions if, and only if, the core is non-empty for each 
induced preference profile. 
We fist prove the sufficiency part, then comment on the proof of the necessity part, 
and end this section with a discussion of which assumptions may be dropped and which 
assumptions may be relaxed. 
The key part of the proof of the sufficiency part relies on the following result about 
metarankings. A metaranking is a transitive relation on a class of coalitions that, re- 
stricted to coalitions containing any particular agent, agrees with preferences of this 
agent. Formally, 
Definition 4.5 (Metaranking). A metaranking on coalitions fiom family B 
2' - (0) is a transitive relation =$ on coalitions from B such that for any i E I and 
coalitions C, C' E B that contain i, 
C Zi C' C =$ C'. 
An example of a metaranking is determined by the per-head value of a coalition 
in a coalition formation followed by the equal division of value. The existence of a 
metaranking is a strong and desirable property of a coalition formation game. For 
instance, Pycia (2006; Chapter 1 of the thesis) shows that if there is a metaranking, 
then coalition structures in the core are obtained as Strong Nash Equilibriag of a broad 
class of non-cooperative coalit ion formation games. ' O 
Proposition 4.6 (Existence of a Metaranking on Proper Coalitions). As- 
sume there are at least four agents. If a regular post-matching mechanism induces 
preference profiles pairwisealigned on proper coalitions, then for each induced prefer- 
ence profile there is a metaranking on proper coalitions. 
Proof. Consider proper coalition C and agent a E C. Because of monotonicity, 
G (a, C, v' (C)) = G (a, C, v (C)) implies G (b, C, v' (C)) = G (b, C, v (C)) for any values 
v (C) , v' (C) . Thus, we can define the payoff translation functions tga : (0, oo) + (0, oo) 
for each proper coalition C and agents a, b E C by the condition 
tEa (G (a, C, G))  = G (b, C, G) , G 2 0. 
. The pairwise alignment guarantees that tga = t f i .  Thus, we can refer to translation 
function between a and b as 
Choose an arbitrary reference agent w* and fix the value function v : C + R+. 
Because of the full range assumption, t W * ,  (G (a, C, v (C))) is well defined for any agent 
a and proper coalition C 3 a even when w* $ C. By pairwise consistency, 
tw*,a (G (a, C, v (C))) = t w * , , ~  (G (a', C, v (C))) 
for any different a, a' E C. Indeed, if w* E C then the claim follows straightforwardly 
from the pairwise consistency. If w* 6 C, then by full range there is a value function 
v' : C -+ R+ such that 
G (a', C, v' (C)) = G (a', {a, a', w*) , v' ({a, a', w*))) , and 
v' (C) = V (C) . 
'Cf. Aumann (1959)) Rubinstein (1980). We may alternatively use the solution concept of Coalition- 
Proof Nash Equilibrium of Bernheim, Peleg, Whinston (1987). 
1°~espite  the attractiveness of the existence of metarankings as a property of coalition formation 
games, it is difficult to use metarankings as a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core. 
The difficulty lies in constructing an index - such as the per-head value of a coalition - for each coalition 
formation game. Our results solve this problem by connecting the existence of metarankings with the 
pairwise alignment, which is readily verifiable in a variety of settings. 
Then, the pairwise alignment implies that also 
G (a, C, v'(C)) = G (a, {a, a', w*) ,v' ({a, a', w*))) . 
Since w* E {a, a', w*), we have 
tw* ,a (G (a, C, v (C))) = tw* ,a (G (a, C, v'(C) )
= tw* ,a (G (a, {a, a', w*} v' ({a, a', w* 1) )) 
- tw*,al (G (a', {a, a', w*) v' ({a', a', w*)))) 
- 
- t w * , a ~  (G (a', C, v'(C))) 
- 
- t w * , , ~  (G (a', C, v (C))) 
Consequently, 
x (C) = t w * ,  (G (a, C, V (C))) 
does not depend on a if C is fixed. Monotonicity of the mechanism implies that x (C) 
determines a metaranking on proper coalitions. This completes the proof. 
Proof of the sufEciency part of Theorem 4.4. Let us consider an auxiliary preference 
profile (5:),, such that 
I 5; c 
for all i E I and proper C 3 i, and 
for all i E I and proper C, C' 3 i. Pycia (2006)" shows that to prove the non-emptiness 
of the core for the profile (di)iEI it is enough to prove it for (5i)i,I. By the above 
  or completeness, the relevant result is fomrulated and proved in this footnote. 
Proposition. If the core of (zi)i,I contains a two or more elements coalition structure and (z:)i,z 
is equivalent to (zi)iEI on proper coalitions, then the core of (z:)iEz is non-empty. 
Proof. If {I )  is in the core of (z:)i,z, then the claim is true. Also, if there is a coalition structure 
S # {I)  in the core of ($i)iEz such that at least one agent weakly prefers S to {I}, then S is 
in the core with regard to preferences (zi)iEz, and the claim is true. 
Otherwise, all agents strictly prefer { I )  to any S # {I) in the core of (zi)iEz and {I) is not in the 
core of (z:)i,I. Then, there exists a coalition C such that all its members strictly prefer C to I in 
preferences (z:)iEI . Take a proper coalition structure S in the core of (zi)iEI. Then C 6 S. Hence 
there is an agent a E C such that C 5, S (a). But then a strictly prefers I to S (a), weakly prefers 
S (a) to C, and strictly prefers C to I ,  which is a contradiction. QED 
construction and Proposition 4.6, there is a metaranking on all coalitions that reflects 
the preference profile (-Q,,. Hence, the Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) type of argument 
used to prove the claim of Example 3.1 shows that the core is non-empty for (5:)icI. 
This completes the proof. 
As an inspection of the proof shows, we can drop the assumption of there being at 
least four agents if preferences are pairwise aligned on all coalitions that is if for all 
agents i, j and coalitions C, C 3 i, j, we have 
The necessity part of Theorem 4.4 is proved in the appendix. The proof relies on 
the following two lemmas. 
Lemma 4.7. If a regular mechanism induces preferences such that 
for all i, j E I and proper coalitions C, 'C' 3 i, j, then preferences generated by the 
mechanism are pairwise aligned on proper coalitions. 
Lemma 4.8. If a regular mechanism generates preference profiles with non-empty 
core and coalitions ClY2, C2,3, C3 ,~ ,  and agents al, a2, a3 are such that12 {ai) = Ci-l,i n 
Ci,i+l, then, 
C3,l -al C1,2 and C1,2 -a2 C2,3 * C2,3 2 0 3  C3,l- 
Let us finish this section with the discussion of assumptions. First, let us recall that 
Example 3.2 showed that even for the sufficiency part, it is not enough to assume that 
a single preference profile is pairwise aligned. Second, notice that Lemma 4.7 shows 
that for regular mechanisms the pairwise alignment assumption may be relaxed. Third, 
the monotonicity and continuity assumptions are not needed in the sufficiency part of 
Theorem 4.4 and Proposition 4.6 and the following result is true: 
Theorem 4.9 (Sufficiency for Full-Range Mechanisms) .I3  Assume there are 
at least four agents. If a full-range post-matching mechanism induces preference profiles 
l2 We adopt the convention that subscripts are modulo 3 that is Cili+1 = C3,1 if i = 3 and Ci-lli = C3,1 
i f i = l .  
13Proofs of Theorems 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 are presented in the appendix. 
pairwise-aligned on proper coalitions, then the core is non-empty. Moreover, there is a 
met aranking on proper coalit ions. 
Fourth, for the necessity part of the equivalence, it is enough to assume that the 
core is non empty for superadditive value functions. A value function v : C -+ R is 
superadditive if 
v (Cl u C2) I v (Cl) + v (Cz) 
for any disjoint Cl , C2 E C. 
Theorem 4.10 (Necessity for Superadditive Values). Assume there are at 
least four agents. If a regular post-matching mechanism induces preference profiles with 
non-empty core for all superadditive value functions, then the mechanism is pairwise 
aligned on proper coalitions. 
Finally, if we assume pairwise alignment on all coalitions, then the core coalition 
structure is generically unique. 
Theorem 4.11 (Uniqueness). Assume there are at least four agents. If a full-range 
post-matching mechanism induces preference profiles pairwise-aligned on all coalitionsi 
then the core is non-empty and for generic value function contains a unique coalition 
structure. Moreover, there is a metaranking on all coalitions. 
5. Applications and Examples 
This section analyzes several examples of coalition formation environments and uses 
the results of Section 4 to determine whether the core is non-empty. The mechanisms 
considered are Nash bargaining, Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game, the egalitarian and 
Rawlsian division rules, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution, and the 
Shapley value. 
We consider the setting of Section 4. Recall that there are two dates. On date 1, 
firms and workers match but do not contract. Agents' preferences are determined by 
their payoffs on date 2. On date 2, each coalition C realizes a payoff profile from the 
set of feasible payoffs 
where v (C) is the value of coalition C and v : C + R+ is the value function. We 
allow the payoffs ui to represent expected payoffs from lotteries over a larger space of 
outcomes. Coalition C realizes a payoff profile by playing some game, following some 
bargaining protocol, or using some sharing rule. 
Nash Bargaining. On date 2, each resultant coalition, C, creates value v (C) 2 0, 
and its members divide v (C) according to the Nash bargaining solution. That is, each 
agent i is endowed with an increasing and concave utility function Ui, and agents' payoffs 
si maximize 
m a  n (Ui (si) - Ui (0)) 
si20,iEC 
CEC 
subject to 
Thus, agents' preferences over coalitions are induced by Nash bargaining. 
Corollary 5.1. If preferences . . during matching are induced by Nash bargaining, then 
there exists a stable coalition structure.. The coalition structure is generically unique. 
This result is a corollary of Theorem 4.11 because Nash bargaining generates pairwise 
aligned preferences. l4 
14Three remarks about the Nash bargaining example might be of interest. First, the Nash structure 
allows for the following direct proof of theorem 5.... Let us first observe that ui(;,!(,l;'(O1, called the 
fear of ruin coefficient (see Aumann and Kurz (1977a, 1977b) and Roth (1979)), is the same for every 
agent in a coalition that divides value in Nash bargaining. Indeed, the Lagrange multiplier in the Nash 
U!(s;) bargaining maximization equals the inverse of the fear of ruin, (I, (s:) -ui (0) . Additionally, the larger the 
fear of ruin of an agent is, the more the agent gains in a given coalition. Thus, no agents would ever 
want to change a coalition that maximizes their fear of ruin. Therefore, the coalition with maximal fear 
of ruin may be treated as if its members did not participate in the matching between the remaining 
agents. In this way, one can recursively construct a core coalition structure. This completes the proof. 
Second, the core is non-empty when preferences come from an asymmetric Nash bargaining 
where agent i has bargaining power Xi and the division of value v (C) in coalition C maximizes 
niEc (Ui (si) - Ui (0))" over si 2 0, i E C, subject to CiEc si 5 v (C). In this extension, the 
bargaining powers Xi are agent-specific but are not coalition-specific. 
Third, the values v (C) may either accrue to the entire coalition or be composed of parts that accrue 
to individual members. In the latter case, the existence of a stable matching relies on the assumptions 
that agents' utilities are quasi-linear in a numeraire, and that, after the coalitions are determined, the 
agents can contract. Then, v (C) is the sum of values that accrue to members in an optimal contract. 
Notice that the grand coalition does not necessarily form even if the value function 
is superadditive. Moreover, a strong bargaining power may hurt agents by making them 
less desirable coalition partners. 
Rent-seeking. On date 2, agents in each formed coalition C = {al, . . ., ak) engage 
in Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game over a prize v (C). Each ai E C will be able to 
lobby at cost ci to capture the prize v (C) with probability Thus, if agents 
expand resources cl , . . ., ck then agent ai obtains in expectation 
II 
The agents play the Nash equilibrium of this rent-seeking game; every agent lobbies at 
cost F v  (C) and has expected payoff 9. Theorem 4.4 applies and there is a stable 
matching in any matching problem with payoffs determined by the Tullock rent-seeking. 
Egalitarian bargaining solution and the Rawlsian social choice function. 
Let Ui be the utility of agent i from payoff Si. The egalitarian solution is the maximal 
point in the set of feasible payoffs V (C) where all agents have equal utility. The Rawlsian 
social choice function chooses a point in V (C) that maximizes the utility of the worst-off 
agent. l5 In our setting if the agents' utilities are continuous in (monetary) payoffs then 
the egalitarian solution and the Rawlsian social choice function coincide. Both solutions 
generate pairwise aligned payoffs, and the core is non-empty. ti 
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. Let Ui be the utility of agent i from 
payoff si. The Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution selects the Pareto optimal 
profile of payoffs (si)iEC E V (C) such that 
This solution is regular if limt,,Ui (t)  = oo. As the example below shows, in general 
this solution does not satisfy pairwise alignment, and hence there exists a value function 
v : C -t R+ for which the core is empty. 
Example 5.2. Consider I = {1,2,3,4) and Ul(s) = log( l+s )  and Uz(s) = 
U'' (s) = U4 (s) = S. Then preferences of agents 1 and 2 are not aligned. 
'Tf. for instance Thomson and Lensberg (1989). 
lGThe solutions are regular if Ui ( t )  -+ oo when t + co. The index x ( C )  = Ui (G (i, C ,  v ( C ) ) )  
determines a metaranking. 
Shapley value. On date 2, a subcoalition C' of coalition C can unilaterally achieve 
the value vC (C') . Assume that the values vC are superadditive and set vC (8) = 0. The 
Shapley value of agent i E C is given by 
Si= C (#C1)! (#C - # C  - I)! (#C)! [vc ( C  u (2)) - vC (c')] C'CC 
and is regular. 
If, on date 2 each proper subcoalition of C achieves the sum of its members reserva- 
tion values, then the Shapley division is equivalent to Nash bargaining, and the core is 
non-empty. 
If, however, on date 2 each proper subcoalition C' of C can achieve value 
vC (C') = v (C') 
(i.e., same value that C' would achieve if formed on date I), then - as shown by the 
example below - agents' preferences are not necessarily pairwise aligned, and hence there 
exists a superadditive value function for which the core is empty. 
~ x ' k n ~ l e  5.3. Consider I = {1,2,3,4) and the value functions v such that 
where x and y are positive parameters, and v (C)  = 0 for remaining coalitions C. If 
x and y are such that agent 1 is indifferent between {1,2) and {1,2,3) then agent 2 
prefers {1,2) over {1,2,3), and the preferences of agents 1 and 2 are not aligned. 
6. Consistency and Pairwise Alignment 
Pairwise alignment of preference profiles is related to the idea of consistency of 
solution concepts. Consistency is a met a-requirement and the definition of consistent 
solution concept vary between economic environments (cf. Thomson (2004)). In case 
of Pareto optimal division of a value 5,17 the definition of consistency introduced by 
Harsanyi (1959)18 to study Nash bargaining might be stated as follows. 
Definition 6.1. A Pareto optimal mechanism is consistent if 
2, C', v (C) - x G (j, C, v (C))) = G (i, C, v (C)) 
jEC-C' 
for any C' c C and i E C'. 
In many environments, a consistent solution concept generates pairwise aligned pref- 
erences. 
Theorem 6.2. A Pareto-optimal monotonic mechanism is consistent if, and only 
if, it generates pairwise aligned profiles. 
Proof. Assume that the mechanism is consistent. Let a, b E C n C  and a is indifferent 
between C and C'. Notice that it is enough to show that b is indifferent between C and 
C' for C = {a, b } .  Then C' c C,  and by the consistency equation 
for i E C'. Since, a is indifferent between C and C', monotonicity implies that 
Hence, b is indifferent between C and C'. 
17A mechanism is Pareto optimal if for all values i, it generates payoffs that are Pareto optimal that 
is xiEc G ( 2 ,  C, G )  = 5. 
1 8 ~ h e  idea of consistency of solution concepts was introduced by Harsanyi (1959) in his analysis of 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives in Nash bargaining. In terms of our definition, he restricted 
the choice of C' to two-element sets; in our setting both variants of the definition give same concept 
ss may be seen from the proof of Theorem 6.2. Lensberg (1987,1988), Thomson (1988), Lensberg and 
Thomson (1 989), Hart and Mas-Collel (1989), and Young (1994) analyzed related notions of consistency 
in the context of Nash bargaining, welfare functions, Walrasian trade, the Shapley value, and sharing 
rules. Thomson (2004) gives an up-to-date survey of these results. 
Finally, assume that the mechanism generates pairwise aligned profiles. Pareto o p  
timality implies that the consistency equation holds true for singleton C'. Assume that 
consistency equation is satisfied for C' of size n and consider C' of size n + 1. Set 
v (C') = v (C) - C G ( j ,  C, v (C)) . 
Take a E C such that G (a, C', v (C')) -G (a, C, v (C)) is maximal. By Pareto optimality, 
G (a, C', v (C')) - G (a, C, v (C)) 2 0 
Then, by monotonicity of G and the inductive assumption for i E C - {a), 
G (i, C', v (C')) = G (i, C' - {a) , v (C') - G (a, C', v (C'))) 
= G (i, C, v (C)) . 
Pairwise alignment implies that G (i, C', v (C')) = G (i, C, v (C)) for all i E C'. This 
ends the proof. 
As an immediate consequence of Theorems 4.4 and 6.2, we obtain the following. 
Corollary 6.3. Suppose there are at least four agents. Assume that a mechanism 
that determines the payoffs in proper coalitions is regular and Pareto optimal. The 
mechanism is consistent if, and only if, the core is non-empty for all value functions. 
Interestingly, a historical name used to refer to consistency was "stability," cf. Lens- 
berg and Thornson (1989). Thus, in the old terminology, the result says that a mech- 
anism is stable (i.e., consistent) iff it generates stable (i.e., core) coalition formation 
problems. 
7. A Characterization of Linear Sharing Rules and Pareto Optimal 
Mechanisms with Non-Empty Core 
This section characterizes the class of linear sharing rules and the class of Pareto- 
optimal regular mechanisms that induce pairwise aligned preference profiles, and hence 
non-empty core. 
Linear sharing rules. On date 2, agents divide the value using a coalition-specific 
linear sharing rule. The share of agent i in the value created by coalition C is ki,c. This 
agent obtains 
~i = k i , c ~  (C) . 
The shares ki,c > 0 are coalition-specific, xi,c k,c = 1, and ki,c do not depend on the 
realization of v (C). 
In this case, the pairwise-alignrnent requirement takes the following simple form. 
Corollary 7.1 (Sufficiency). If agents divide the values using a linear sharing rule 
with shares kilt, then there exists a stable matching if 
for all proper C, C and i, j E C n C'. 
This corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.4 because linear sharing 
rules with kjc > 0 are regular.lg Banarjee, Konishi, and Sonmez (2001) showed that a 
slightly smaller class of linear sharing rules leads to non-empty one-sided core in coalition 
formation. 
The condition on shares is also necessary, in the following sense. 
Corollary 7.2 (Necessity). Suppose that there are at least two firms able to 
employ two or more workers each. If agents divide the values using a linear sharing rule 
with shares ki,c, and there exists a stable matching for all value functions v : C + R+ , 
then 
for all C, C' and i, j E C n C'. 
lY We can also extend the result to allow for kilt = 0. 
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This corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.12. 
Notice, that if agents' utilities are Ui (s) = sX', then the Nash bargaining will lead 
to linear division of value, and the resultant sharing rule will satisfy the above condi- 
tion. Corollary 6.2 implies a partial converse of this statement. If there are firms able 
to employ two workers, and a profile of shares kiYc guarantees an existence of stable 
matching for all v : C + R+ then the shares kvc may be rationalized as coming from a 
Nas h bargaining. 
Pareto-optimal regular mechanisms. Consider risk-neutral agents. On date 2, 
the members of each formed coalition C choose a utility profile E R?' that 
maximizes the Bergson-Samuelson separable welfare functional 
max Wi (ui). 
( ~ C ) i c c  i E C  
subject to zsc ui 5 v (C). The welfare components Wi, i E I, are increasing and 
concave. They are agent-specific, but not coalition-specific. 
Lensberg's (1987) results on consistency of w e l f ~ e  maximization and our Theorem 
6.1 imply that payoffs (u?)~,, are pairwise aligned.20 Hence, we obtain the following. 
Corollary 7.3 (Sufficiency). If payoffs are 'determined by the maximization of a 
Bergson- Samuelson separable welfare fundional, then the core is non-empty. 
Lensberg's (1987) also showed that all Pareto optimal and continuous choice rules 
that produce pairwise-aligned profiles may be interpreted as maximization of a Bergson- 
Samuelson separable welfare functional. In view of the results of Section 6, Lensberg's 
result implies the following2 
Proposition 7.4 (based on Lensberg (1987)). Suppose that a post-matching mech- 
anism G has full range, is monotonic, and the payoffs (G (2, C, v (C)))iEc are Pareto 
- - 
201n fact, x (C) = Wi (ui), for some i E C, determines a metaranking. 
21The appendix provides a simple proof of this result. 
for all value functions v : C -t R+. If the mechanism induces pairwise-aligned preference 
profiles, then there exist increasing strictly concave differentiable functions Wi : Ui -, R 
for i E I such that Wi (0) = +oo, and 
This proposition22 and Theorem 4.10 imply the following. 
Corollary 7.5 (Necessity). Suppose that a post-matching mechanism G has full 
range, is monotonic, and the payoffs (G (i, C, v (C)))iEc are Pareto optimal in 
for any v (C). If the mechanism induces preference profiles with non-empty core for 
superadditive value functions, then there exist increasing strictly concave differentiable 
functions Wi : [Ti -, R for i E I such that W: (0) = +oo, and 
8. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a sufEicient condition for the non-emptiness of the core. The 
main component of this condition is the pairwise alignment of preferences. The sufficient 
condition is necessary for the existence of core coalition structures for all value functions. 
For Pareto optimal mechanisms the condition is equivalent to the consistency of the 
solution concept employed by agents to divide the payoffs within each proper coalition. 
The sufficiency and necessity results allow one to determine which sharing rules or 
games induce the existence of core coalition structures. There is always a core coalition 
structure if agents' preferences are induced by Nash bargaining, egalitarian or Rawlsian 
22Both in Proposition 6.4 and Corollary 6.5, it is enough to assume that agents' payoff are Pareto 
optimal in a subset V' (C) of the quasi-linear set V (C) as long as the Pareto frontier of each V' (C) is 
continuous in the value u (C) . 
sharing rules, or Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game. The core may be empty if agents' 
preferences are determined by the Kalai-Smorodinsky or Shapley bargaining. The paper 
also applies the sufficiency and necessity results to (i) determine the class of linear 
sharing rules that always induce agents' preferences such that a st able matching exists, 
and (ii) characterize the class of Pareteoptimal regular mechanisms that induce the 
existence of core coalition structures. 
All results of this paper remain true for individual stability.23 Theorem 4.11 and 
the positive results of sections 5 and 7 remain true for the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
stable set24 but other results do not. An analogous theory is true for the core in the 
man-woman-child problem and other mult i-sided matching problems. In many-teone 
matching problems weaker conditions are sufficient and necessary for the non-empt iness 
of the core, and even weaker conditions are sficient and necessary for the existence 
of individually stable matchings. Finally, the results might also be adapted to the 
roommate problem if one replaces the pairwise alignment with the property proved in 
Lemma 4.8. 
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Appendices to Sections 4 and 7 
Appendix to Section 4. 
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Fix i ,  j E I and proper C, C' 3 2, j. It is enough to consider 
the case i # j and C # C'. Assume that the value function v is such that C zi C' in the 
induced preference profile zI. Use the full range assumption to find a value v' (C) such 
that C -: C' in the induced preference profile 5;. Then, v' (C) L: v (C) and C N: C'. 
The monotonicity of the mechanism implies that C zj GI. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.8. For an indirect proof assume that there exists a cycle 
Cly2, ..., C3,1 that satisfies assumptions of the lemma but C3,1 Nal C1,2, C2,3, 
and c2,3 +a3 C3.1- 
Use monotonicity and continuity of the mechanism to find a profile of coalition values 
such that C3,1 Nal C1,2, C1,2 +a2 C2,3, and C2,3 +a3 C3,1 (we continue to denote the new 
preference profile by the same symbol). Repeating this argument, find a profile of values 
such that C3,l +al C1,2, C1,2 +a2 C2,3, and C2,3 +a3 C3,l- 
Lower the values on all coalitions C different from C1,2, C2,3, C3,i SO that for all 
i E C1,2 U C2,3 U C3,i we have 
C ci,i+l- 
The resultant profile of preferences does not admit a stable matching. This completes 
the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4 (necessity part). By Lemma 4.7, it is enough to take 
proper coalitions A, B and a, b E A n B,  and show that 
Furthermore, to prove this implication it is enough to show it for B = {a, b). Thus 
assume that A ma B = {a ,  b). Let c E I - A c I - B. Change the values on {a, c) and 
{b, c) so that 
Then, by Lemma 4.8, 
Moreover, we have 
Thus, by Lemma 4.8, 
and the proof is completed. 
Definition 4.9.1 (Rich Domain). A domain of preference profiles R is rich if 
for any agent i E I, proper coalitions C, C' 3 i, and any R, there exists a profile 
$;E R such that C N: C' and all agents' 5; preferences between coalitions other than 
C are the same as in $ I  . 
A domain of all preference profiles that might be generated in the equal division rule 
of Section 3 for different value functions v : C -t R+ is rich. Any full-range mechanism 
induces a rich domain of preference profiles when applied to different configurations 
of coalitions' payoff profile sets. The domain of all profiles in any coalition formation 
problem is also rich. 
Lemma 4.9.2. Assume that there are at least four agents. Let the profile Z I  belong 
to a rich domain R of pairwisealigned preference profiles. Then there are no cycles of 
three proper coalitions C1,2, C2,3, C3,i E C such that 
(a) there is an agent ai E Ci-l,i n Ci,i+l, 
(b) C3,i kas C2,3 ka2 C1,2 kal C3,1 with at least one strict preference . 
Proof. For an indirect proof, assume tha t  t here are proper coalit ions Cl ,2, C2,3, C3,1 E 
C satisfying (a) and (b) . Consider C = {al, a2, as). If C is different from the coalitions 
C3,1, C1,2, C2,3, then there exists a pairwisealigned preference profile Z;E R such that 
and 
c3,1 Zk, C1,2 Zb2 C2,3 $hs C3,1 
with indifference if there was an indifference in the cycle. A repeated application of 
the pairwise-alignment property of Z:,  shows that 
a al is 5; indifferent between C and C3,1, and thus prefers C to Cl12; 
a a2 prefers c to Cl,2, and thus to C2,3; and 
a3 prefers C to C ~ , J ,  and thus to C3,1- 
None of the preferences on the cycle may be strict, as otherwise a3 would strictly prefer 
C to C3,i, contrary to as's indifference between these two coalitions. 
If C equals one of the coalitions C3,1, C1,2, C2,3, then we can repeat the above argu- 
ment without the need to refer to the rich domain. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 4.9.3. There exists a metaranking on proper coalitions if and only if there 
is no cycle of proper coalitions C12, CW-.., Cml E C for some m 2 2 such that 
(a) There exists ai E Ci-l,i n Ci,i+l for i = 1, . . . , m and Ciel,i Zai Ci,i+l. 
(b) For at least one i the preference is strict Ci-l,i 4, Ci,i+l. 
Proof. (+) For an indirect proof, consider coalitions C12, C23.. , Cml such that 
ai E Ci-1,i n Ci,i+l, i E (1, ..., m), satisfy conditions (a) and (b) of the definition of a 
blocking cycle. Let CmY1 +,, ClY2. Then ClY2 4 c2,3, C2,3 =$ C34, etc., and by transitivity 
C1,2 4 Cm,l. Thus C1,2 $al Cm,l, contradicting CmY1 C1,2. 
(+) Define relation 4 so that C 4 C' whenever there exists a sequence of proper 
coalitions Ci,i+1 E C such that 
C' = Cm,m+l, and 
a there is an agent ai E Ci-lyi n Ci,i+l such that Ci-l,i +ai C,,i+l for certain i. 
Then 4 is transitive. It remains to verify that for proper C, C with i E C n C' 
To prove the first implication take Clj2 = C, C 2 , ~  = Cr and i = al. TO prove the reverse 
implication assume that C or C' are proper, i E C n C', and C 4 C'. Now, if C +i C', 
then there would exist a blocking cycle; hence C Zi C'. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorems 4.9. For an indirect proof, assume that the core for ZI is 
empty. In particular, a metaranking on proper coalitions does not exist. By Lemma 
4.9.3, the lack of a metaranking on proper coalitions means that there exists a blocking 
cycle of proper coalitions C12, C23.. , Cml E C for some m 2 2 such that 
(a) There exists ai E Ci-l,i n CiYi+l for i = 1, ..., m and Ci-1,i Zai Ciyi+l. 
(b) For at least one i the preference is strict Ci-l,i 4, Cis+l. 
We will proceed by induction. Notice that the case m = 2 follows directly from the 
pairwise alignment, and the case m = 3 follows from Lemma 4.9.2. For an inductive 
step, fix m 2 4, and assume that there are no blocking cycles of strictly fewer than m 
coalitions. Let C = {a1 , a2, a3). 
First consider the case when C = Ci,i+l, for some i = 1, . . . , m. Look at C1,2, C2,3, C 
and conclude from Lemma 4.9.2 that either Cl,z +,, C, or C2,3 +a3 C, or C C1,2 
C2,3 -a3 C. 
If C = Ci,i+1 and CIZ +al C then i # 1 and the shorter cycle 
satisfies (a) and (b) because Cmv1 Zal Clg2 +,, C = Ci,i+l. This is impossible, 
however, by the inductive assumption. 
If C = Ci,i+l and C2,3 +a3 C then i # 2 and the shorter cycle 
satisfies (a) and (b) because C 4 ,  c2,3 ZF3 CC3,4 Again, this is impossible by the 
inductive assumption. 
If C C1,2 wa2 C2,3 ma3 C then the cycle C, C3,4..  , Cm,l is blocking contrary to 
the inductive assumption. 
Finally consider the case C f Ci,i+l for all i. We can use the rich domain assump 
tion to find a pairwisealigned preference profile Zr  such that all preferences along the 
blocking cycle are preserved and C Nal Cmll. Abusing notation let us refer to the new 
profile as Zr .  Consider two subcases depending on preference of a3 between C and c2,3. 
If C 4 ,  C2,3, then consider the collection of m - 1 coalitions C, C3,4, C4,5, . . . , Cm,1. 
This is a blocking cycle of length m - 1 because C +,, C2,3 Za3 C3,4. 
If C ka3 C2,3, then consider the collection of three coalitions C1,2, C2,3, C. Since 
C -al Cm,l, we have C zal C1,2. Thus the collection Cl , C2, C satisfies 
By Lemma 4.9.2 all agents are then indifferent. But then C, C3,4..., Cm,l is a 
blocking cycle of m - 1 coalitions, contrary to the inductive assumption. This 
completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4.10. Notice that if the initial profile of values was superad- 
ditive, then the proof of Lemma 4.8 and the proof of the necessity in Theorem 4.4 may 
be carried out while maintaining the superadditivity of the profile of values. 
Proof of Theorem 4.11. By Proposition 4.5 there is a metaranking =$ on all 
proper coalitions. Extend this metaranking onto a relation on all coalitions by defining 
and verify that the extended relation =$ is still a metaranking. Now, the construction 
from Example 3.1 shows that whenever no agent is indifferent between two coalitions, 
then there is a unique core coalition structure. This lack of indifferences is generic, and 
thus the proof is completed. 
Appendix to Section 7 
Proof of Proposition 7.2. The proof of Proposition 4.6, presented in Section 4, 
constructs the payoff translation functions t b ,  : (0, oo) -+ (0,oo) for any agents a, b. 
Recall that for each coalition C 3 a, b, we have 
By the monotonicity of mechanism G, functions t b ,  are strictly increasing. Since G 
generates Pareto optimal profiles, funct ions t b,a are continuous. 
Choose an arbitrary reference agent w* and define 
where f : (0, oo) + R is continuous, decreasing, f (s) -+ +oo as s -t 0+, and such that 
Notice that there exists a function f that satisfies these conditions. Indeed, there is a 
finite number k of functions tW*,, which are all continuous, increasing, and have value 0 
at 0. Take 
tmax = max {t,.,,) 
a 
and notice that it is also continuous and increasing, and has value 0 at 0. The functions 
1Ct, are integrable to infinity at 0 if f 0 tmax is. This will be so if, for example, 
Moreover, f is continuous and decreasing (since smax is continuous and increasing), and 
f (s) + +oo as s + O+ (because smax (t) 4 0 as t + 0). Notice that Qa are positive 
and strictly decreasing and define, 
NOW, Wa are concave and increasing, and lim,,o+ Wa (s) = -00. 
It remains to show that the solution to 
max C Wa (Ga) = C J, --- $a (I) d7 
C a e ~  'a'V a€C a€C 
coincides with G (a, C, V). Concavity of the problem implies that there is a solution. 
Since the slope at 0 for each S,"" $a (r) d r  is infinite, so the solution is internal. The 
differentiability of the objective fundion implies that the internal solution is given by 
the first order Lagrange conditions 
and the possibility constraint (Ga) laEC E V. The first order condition can be rewritten 
as 
tw*,a (Go) = f (A)  
or 
Ga = ta,w* (f (A)) - 
If there is no worker in C,  then C = {f) for some f E F and the claim we are proving 
is true. Otherwise, fix an agent w E C and notice that for agents a E C 
G (a, C, V) = ta,, (G (a, C, V ) )  
Lemma 4.9.2 &om the appendix to section 4 shows that 
Hence, 
G (a, C, V) = ta,w* (tw*,w (G (a, C, V ) ) )  = t,w* (2) 
for some x E R. 
This equation, the analogous equation for 6, above, the monotonicity of t,,*, the 
Pareto optimality of the mechanism, and the possibility constraint (ii,) laEC E V imply 
that 
Go = G (a, C, V) . 
This completes the proof. 

Design of Goods with Multiple Attributes 
1. Introduction 
Determining the optimal design of a product line of goods with multiple attributes 
when a monopolistic firm sells to buyers with unknown valuations is a long-standing 
unsolved problem.1 So far only some special examples have been solved, cf. Wilson 
(1993), Arrnstrong (1996), Rochet and Chon6 (1998), Armstrong (1999), Arrnstrong 
and Rochet (1999), and Thanassoulis (2004). Among the strategies to approach the 
problem, McAfee and McMillan's (1988) proposal has proved particularly infl~ential.~ 
McAfee and McMillan (1988) consider a monopolist who designs and sells a product 
line of goods with several indivisible a t t r ib~tes .~  Buyers' utility is linear in price and in 
the probabilities of obtaining the attributes4 The values of the attributes are buyers' 
private information. The monopolist has zero marginal cost and aims to maximize the 
expected revenue subject to buyers' incentive and participation constraints. Mc Afee 
and McMillan argued that - at least in some cases - the problem may be reduced to 
finding the optimal menu of deterministic bundles. In effect, the subsequent literature5 
focused on finding the optimal deterministic bundles; the corresponding class of seller's 
strategies has been referred to as simple b~ndling.~ 
McAfee and McMillan's claim is known to be true in the case of one attribute solved 
by Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) .7 One way to understand the intuition behind the one- 
dimensional case is to think of the problem as a single unit auction with one buyer, in 
which setting a reservation price is an optimal strategy (Myerson (1983), Bulow and 
Roberts (1989)) .8 Recently, however, several authors including Pycia (2000), Manelli 
'The one-dimensional version of the problem was solved by Mussa and Rosen (1978). 
2Cf. Avery and Hendershott (2000), Miller, Piankov, and Zeckhauser (2002), and papers cited in 
footnote 6. 
"his is the model of the third part of McAfee and McMillan (1988). What is being sold is interpreted 
in the present paper as  a good with multiple attributes. McAfee and McMillan favor a formally 
equivalent interpretation of selling a bundle of multiple indivisible commodities. 
4Stochastic presence of an attribute may be interpreted as lower quality, limited quantity, restrictive 
lease terms, or damaging a la Deneckere and McAfee (1996). 
5Cf. McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989), McAdams (1998), and Manelli and Vincent (2003). 
"he simple bundling strategies include both pure and mixed bundling of Adams and Yellen (1976). 
7Similar one-dimensional results were proved by Stokey (1979), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), and 
Courty and Hao (2000). 
" more direct intuition for this result is as follows. Think of the seller as selling the attribute 
and Vincent (2003), Thanassoulis (2004), and Kendall(2004) independently constructed 
counterexamples to show that there are distributions of agents'v aluations for which the 
simple bundling strategies are suboptimal.g 
This paper makes one positive and one negative contribution to the understanding 
of multidimensional screening in the setting proposed by McAfee and McMillan. On 
the positive side, the paper fully solves the case of an arbitrary number of attributes 
when there are only two buyer types, which adds a new simple example to the few 
known examples of solved multidimensional screening problems. On the negative side, 
the paper proves that generically simple bundling strategies are suboptimal, contrary to 
Mc Afee and McMillan's hypothesis. 
The positive contribution is developed in Sections 3 and 4 that study situations 
with two types of buyers. As in the analysis of one-dimensional situations with two 
types, it is natural to refer to the buyer with the larger sum of values of all attributes 
as a high type, and to the other type of buyer as a low type. In an equilibrium, the 
high type buys the good with all attributes, and the low type buys the good with the 
attributes for which the ratio of low-type to high-type value is high enough. When the 
'low type values at least one attribute more than the high type does, then the seller 
cannot post per-attribute prices, i.e., genuinely needs to bundle the attributes. When 
the high type values each attribute more than the low type does, the problem may be 
viewed as a collection of one-dimensional subproblems. Profit maximization generically 
requires randomization - that is simple bundling is suboptimal - except when the high 
type obtains an informational rent and when the low type is excluded from the market. 
As in one-dimensional problems, the high type obtains an informational rent when the 
high type is relatively scarce. The low type never has a rent and is excluded from the 
market when the low type is relatively scarce. 
To introduce the negative contribution of the paper let us look at an example in which 
-- 
in probability increments. The incentive constraints imply that if the seller sells an increment to one 
buyer at a given price, then the seller needs to offer this probability increment to all higher valuation 
buyers at this price, and may charge a higher price only on additional increments. However, if the seller 
weakly prefers to sell the first increment at a lower rather than higher price, than the seller weakly 
prefers to sell all subsequent increments at the lower price. 
'Similarly, the simple unidimensional intuition is not robust when the outside options are type 
dependent. Deneckere and McAfee (1996), Rasul and Sonderegger (2001), and Ambjprrnsen (2002), and 
Figueroa and Skreta (2005) find that in some cases type dependent outside options lead to stochastic 
screening (interpretation favoured by Rasul and Sonderegger (2001) and Figueroa and Skreta (2005)) 
or to damaged goods ( Ambjprrnsen (2002), Deneckere and McAfee(1996)). 
the distribution of buyer types require the seller to employ more complex strategies than 
simple bundling. Consider a software company that serves a 50%-50% population of 
sophisticated and unsophisticated users, and sells software packages with two potential 
aktributes: reliability and ease of use. Assume that the sophisticated users are willing to 
pay $300 for reliability and nothing for the ease of use, while the unsophisticated users 
are willing to pay $100 for reliability and also $100 for the ease of use. If restricted to 
simple (deterministic) bundles, the best seller's choices are: 
a sell reliable software to sophisticated users for the price of $300 and easy to use 
software to unsophisticated users for $100, or 
sell the reliable and easy to use software to both types of users for $200. 
Both choices lead to the expected revenue and profits of $200 per user. Using stochastic 
mechanisms, the seller can achieve higher profits. The seller can sell reliable software 
to sophisticated users for $300 and easy to use but only 50% reliable1' software to 
unsophisticated users for $150. This menu of contracts is incentive compatible and 
leads to the expected profit of $225 per buyer, and hence is 12.5% better than the best .. 
simple bundling strategy. 
The negative contribution of the paper is developed in Sections 5 and 6. Section 5 
shows that generically - that is at least on an open and dense set of Lebesgue absolutely 
continuous distributions - simple bundling strategies are suboptimal in the McAfee and 
McMillan model. Section 6 qualifies this result by showing that if there are two buyer 
types, then the maximum seller's loss from not being able to use lotteries is 12.5%, as 
in the example discussed above. 
2. Model 
The formal model is the same as that studied by McAfee and McMillan (1988). A 
monopolistic seller sells a good with n indivisible attributes to a buyer who desires at 
most one unit of each attribute. The utility1' of buyer of type t E [0, lIn from a contract 
1°Cf. footnote 5. 
''We adapt the standard assumption that whenever the buyer is indifferent he chooses a contract 
that brings most profit to the seller. 
composed of price p and the vector of probabilities qi of receiving attributes i = 1, ..., n 
is given by 
U(q,p;t) = t q - p = t l q l  +-. .+tnqn-p- 
The buyer's reservation value equals 0. We denote by F the seller's prior distribu- 
tion over the buyer's types. The seller's valuation or production cost of the goods is 
normalized to be zero, and she seeks to maximize her expected revenue 
subject to the feasibility, participation, and incentive-compatibility constraints of the 
buyer 
q (t) E [o, 11" 7 
tq (t ) - p (t ) 2 O for all t E supp (F) , (IR) 
tq (t) - p (t) 2 tq (t') - p (ti) for all t, t' E supp (F) . (IC) 
A product q E [0, 11" and contract (q; p) offered by the monopoly is called simple (or 
deterministic) if q E (0, l In.  A contract is called complex (or stochastic) if q $ (0,l)". A 
product line is called simple if it contains only simple products. Otherwise, the product 
line is called complex. Similarly, a menu of contracts is called simple if it contains only 
simple contracts, and called complex otherwise. 
3. The Case of Two Attributes and Two Buyer Types 
This section completely characterize the solution to (1) when there are two buyer 
types and two attributes. A monopolistic seller faces 
a buyer of type A = (al, a2) E (0, 112 with probability PA, and 
a buyer of type B = (bl, b2) E (0, 1)2 with probability ,us = 1 - PA. 
If A and B derive the same value from the product with both attributes, then the 
optimal contract is simple and offers the good for the common valuation. Let us thus 
focus on the case when one of the types has a higher valuation for the good with both 
attributes and assume that A values the good more than B does, that is 
When the values of attributes 1 and 2 are positively correlated, that is a1 > bl and 
a2 > b2, then the monopolists may decide for each attribute separately whether to sell 
it to both A and B or only to A. 
Proposition 3.1. Consider the seller's problem (1) with two attributes and buyer's 
types A and B such that a1 > bl and a2 > b2. The optimal contract is simple and offers 
attribute i = 1,2 at price bi if bi 2 ai/L~ and at price ai if bi < ai/L~. 
Consider now the remaining case when the values of attributes 1 and 2 are negatively 
correlated and assume that attribute 2 is valued more by type B than by type A. As a 
consequence of (2) that means 
Proposition 3.2. Consider the seller's problem (1) with two attributes and two 
buyer's types. Suppose (2) and (3). There are two cases: 
If bl 2  alp^ then the simple contract (1,l; bl + bz) is aimed at both types of 
buyers. 
If bl < alps then the simple menus of contracts are suboptimal. The optimal 
menu of contract consists of (1, l ;al  + a2) and ( 3 , l ;  s b l  + b2 . ) 
In the latter case, the optimal simple product line is either ((1,l; bl + b2)) 
or ( ( 1 7  1; a1 + a2) , (07 1; b2)). 
The intuition behind this result is simple. If there are few A types then optimally 
the seller offers the good with both attributes to both types of buyers. If there are many 
A types, then separating the buyers becomes important, and the best separating menu 
of contracts is the one from the proposition. The seller is indifferent between these two 
options if bl =  alp^. The result is formally proved as part of Theorem 4.1 presented 
next. 
4. The Case of an Arbitrary Number of Attributes and Two Buyer Types 
This section extends the analysis of Section 3 to the case of two buyer types and an 
arbitrary number of attributes, and completely characterizes the solution to (1). Now, 
a monopolistic seller faces 
a buyer of type A = ( a l ,  . .., an) E [O,1In with probability pa, and 
a buyer of type B = (bl , . . ., bn) E [0, lIn with probability p~ = 1 - p ~ .  
For simplicity of exposition, assume that each attribute is positively valued by at 
least one buyer, that is 
max {ai, bi) > O for i = 1, ..., n. (4) 
Assume also that A values the contract offering all attributes weakly more than B does, 
that is 
a l +  ...+ an 2 bl+ ...+&. (5) 
We may thus think of A as the high type and of B as the low type. Finally, let. us .also 
reindex 'the at tributes so that 
bi 
- is a weakly increasing sequence. 
ai 
All these assumptions are without loss of generality. 
We will show that in an optimal product line, whenever a product cont ains attribute 
i, then it contains all attributes j > i. The high type will buy a product with all 
attributes, and the low type will buy a product with all attributes above some cut-off 
level. The cut-off level will be shown to be the lower of two potential cut-offs12 
n* = min {i : ai+l+ ... + an < bi+l + ... + bn) , (7) 
and 
In the low type aimed product, the cut-off attribute n* may be randomized and offered 
with probability 
bn*+1 + ... + bn - an*+l - .-. - an 
7 r =  
an* - bn* 
- - 
12By convention, min 0 = +oo. 
90 
Notice that K is well defined and belongs to (0, 11 if n* < +oo. 
Using the above introduced not at ion, the following theorem gives a full characteri- 
zation of the two-type case for an arbitrary number of attributes n = 1,2, . . . . 13 
Theorem 4.1. Assume (4), (5), and (6). 
If bn 5 an or n** 5 n* , then the following simple menu of contracts is optimal14 
If an < bn and n* < n**, then the following menu of contracts is optimal 
\ n*-1 n-n* 1 
In the latter case, generically T E (0,l) and the simple menus are suboptimal 
The basic intuition for the theorem relies on the fact that - except for the case 
when both buyer types buy the good (1, ..., 1) - the IC constraint of type B is slack 
while the IR constraint of type B and the IC constraint of type A are tight. The first 
case corresponds to tight IR constraint of type A and second case corresponds to this 
last constraint being slack. The formal proof is in the appendix. 
Let us finish with several remarks. 
(1) As in Section 3, if A and B derive same the value from the bundle of all attributes 
then the optimal contract is simple and offers a single good with all attributes for the 
common valuation. In terms of Theorem 4.1, the equality of valuations means that 
n* = 1 and K = 1. The optimal menu falls thus under the first case if n*' = 1 and under 
the second case otherwise. 
(2) If the high type has weakly higher valuation for all attributes, then the seller 
may allow the buyers to compose the good from separately priced attributes. As in 
1 3 ~ h e  result may be generalized to the case with continuum of attributes. 
'*If n** = min 0 = foo, then the menu is reduced to offering (1, ..., 1; a1 + ... + a,) to A and shutting 
.B out of the market. 
Proposition 3.1, the optimal contract is simple and offers attributes i = 1, . . ., n at price 
bi if bi 2 a i p ~  and at price ai if bi < aipa. 
If there are attributes that the low type values more than the high type, then the 
seller needs to bundle the attributes and cannot price them separately. 
( 3 )  In equilibrium, the high type buys a good with all attributes, while the low type 
buys the attributes min {n* , n** ) , . . . , n. The attributes bought by the low type include 
all those that the low type values weakly more than the high type does, and may include 
some of the remaining attributes. 
(4) There exists an optimal menu of contracts that includes a simple contract and a 
contract that randomizes over at most one of the attributes. 
(5) Profit maximization generically requires complex menus except if bn 5 a, or 
n** 5 n*. This last condition is equivalent to pa 5 h. Thus, complex menus are 
an* 
called for if the problem is genuinely multidimensional (bn > an) and there are enough 
high types in the population (pa  5 h). an* 
(6) Generically, the high type obtains an informational rent if 
the high type is scarce in the sense pa 5 %, or 
a the problem is reducible to a collection of one-dimensional problems (bi 5 ai 
for i = 1, . . . , n) and the seller is not shutting the low type out of the market 
(paan < bn). 
Otherwise no type obtains a rent. 
Finally notice that screening a continuous distribution of buyers close to the twe  
type distributions requiring complex product lines also requires complex product lines. 
This last point is developed in the next section. 
5. The Generic Suboptimality of Simple Bundling 
This section shows that the generic distribution of buyer types induces the seller 
to offer menus of complex contracts. "Generic" in this context means that the set of 
distributions that require the seller to use complex contracts in order to maximize profits 
contains a dense and open subset of the space of all distributions. The relevant space of 
distributions is the space of Lebesgue absolutely continuous Bore1 probability measures 
on [O, 11" endowed with weak topology relative to bounded continuous functions. 
The seller's problem (I) always has a solution. The seller's problem also has a 
solution if the seller is constrained to use simple bundling strategies.15 The following 
result compares these two solutions. 
Theorem 5.1. For a generic distribution F of buyer types the monopolistic seller 
seeking to maximize (1) can earn strictly more by offering a menu of complex contracts 
than the maximum of expected earnings from menus of simple contracts, that is 
The proof is divided into two parts: density and openness. The proof of the density 
relies on the special structure of simple menus. The structure of simple menus allows 
us to locally perturb a distribution that does not satisfy (9) so that the resultant dis- 
tribution' satisfies (9). This perturbation is a mixture of the original distribution and 
a Lebesgue continuous approximation to a two-type distribution with complex sola.tion 
(given by Proposition 3.2).16 The proof of openness of the set of distributions satisfying 
(9) relies on Berge's maximum theorem and Rochet's (1985) reinterpretation of the IC 
conditions in terms of convexity of buyer's rent as a function of buyer's type. Let us 
start with the density proof and then discuss the framework used to prove openness. 
"Cf. Rochet and Chon6's (1998) or Lemma 5.2. 
:16The genericity result of Theorem 5.1 is not limited to the space of Lebesgue absolutely continuous 
distributions with weak topology. An inspection of the proofs in this paper shows that the class of 
lneasures requiring complex contracts is dense in any space of distributions that contains the class 
of distributions with differentiable Lebesgue densities, and is endowed with topology satisfying the 
following three assumptions: 
1) The class of distributions with differentiable densities is dense. 
2) If Fk -+ F then for every continuous u we have $ udFk -+ $ udF (i.e. the topology is at least as 
strong as the weak topology). 
3) (1 - E )  F + eG --+ F as E --, 0. 
Moreover, under these assumptions the proof in the paper shows that the class of distributions 
requiring complex contracts is locally open around each Lebesgue absolutely continuous distribution. 
Consequently, this class is generic in the space of Lebesgue absolutely continuous distributions. 
Proof of the density part of Theorem 5.1. To show that the set of stochastic distri- 
butions is dense in the set of Lebesgue absolutely continuous probability distributions 
on [O,1In , take a distribution F such that a simple menu of contracts 
is optimal. Our goal is to construct a complex menu uh and a Lebesgue absolutely 
continuous distribution GE such that the seller strictly prefers the menu uh to any simple 
menu if buyer types are distributed according to (1 - a )  F + aG, and a > 0 is small. 
Notice that it is enough to consider the case when the density of F, denoted f ,  
is continuous and its support contained in [6, 1 - 61" for a small 6. For any bundle 
J E (0, lIn, we may also assume the corresponding buyer type tJ = J strictly prefers 
that the contract (J; p;) to all other contracts in u*.17 
To construct uh, let us fix h > 0 and define an auxiliary menu of contracts 
Now, 
uh = iih u { ( K ;  pk)) , 
where K is the complex bundle (1, i , 0, . . . ,0) and pg = i p ~ , , ~  ..., ol + ~ p ~ l , l , o  ,..., ). 
We want to show that profits from uh are the same as from u* up to first order in h 
when buyer types are distributed according to F. For brevity, the profit that the seller 
obtains from menu uh if the buyer types are distributed according to F will be referred 
to as the expected profit from uh over F. The expected profits from iih over F equals 
that from u* over F up to first order in h, because u* is optimal if buyer types are 
distributed according to F. Thus, it is enough to compare profits from uh and iih. 
For a menu of contracts u and a complex contract (J; p J) E u, denote by Ty the 
subset of buyer types that weakly prefer (J; pJ)  to other contracts in u. Notice that for 
any simple bundle J # {(1,0, . . . ,0)) , the types from TY* weakly prefer (J; p;) to any 
other choice in uh. Thus the difference in profits between uh and iih has to come from 
types in .. ,0) n TEh . Furthermore, the mass of ~i;:,,~,.  . .,,) n T;th f-l T:" is of second 
order in h if J # (1,0, . . . ,0) , (1,1,0, . . . ,0). The impact on difference in profits in the 
two remaining subsets . .,o) n T ~ h  nT("llo,o,...,o) and Txo ,o ,  ... ,o) nTgh nT("lr~,o, ..., 0)  cancel 
out because 
l7 We refer to the preferences of types t despite that they are not in the support of F. 
In the first subset uh brings 5 ph - p~l,O,O,...,O)) more per buyer than iih and ( 3 9 ,.-- 
the mass of this subset is up to first order 
e In the second subset iih brings i pi, , 
- ~ i , , ~ , ~  ,... ,o) ( 9 1 ,... ) more per buyer than uh 
and the mass of this subset is up to first order 
Thus uh is first order equivalent to iih and hence to u*. 
To construct a distribution that is close to F and requires complex contracts de- 
note = { O ~ P X , I , O  ,..., 0)  - pil,o,o ,..., 0)  - pi0,l.o , . ,  0)  } and consider a four-type auxiliary 
- 
distribution G with masses 
on points tqefined as follows: 
tl = (p;1,1,0 ,..., 0)  + h7 0,  . - - 7  0) 7 
t2 = (0,  p;0,1,0 ,..., 0)  , 07 ---, 0)  7 
t3 = (p{l,O,O ,..., 0)  + R7 pil,l,O ,..., 0)  - pi1,0,0 ,..., O ) ,  * * . 7  O )  9 
t4 = t3 + (h ,  -2h, 0 ,  ..., 0 ) .  
By assumptions on u*, the points t l ,  t2, t3, t4 E (0, 1)2 x { o ) " - ~  for small h. In the spirit 
of Proposition 3.2, we can show that to extract maximum expected profit from G seller 
may offer bundles (1 ,0 ,0 ,  ..., 0 )  , (0,1,0,  ..., 0)  , (1,1,0,  ..., 0 )  , and K at prices 
This menu is h first order strictly better than an optimum of simple menus. Moreover, 
this menu is a subset of uh and uh would extract the same expected profits from a 
population of buyer types distributed according to G. 
Let us take E > 0 and define the distribution G, to be the convex combination of 
four normal distributions N (t" +h, ( ~ h ) ~ )  restricted to [0, 1jn; the weights are /I (t" , 
i = 1, ..., 4. As E -+ 0+ the expected seller's profit from uh over GE approximates the 
expected profit fiom uh over c. Moreover, lim sup,,o+ of the maximum expected profit 
from a simple menu u over G, approximates the expected profit from u over G, and the 
convergence is uniform over simple menus u and over h > 0. Hence there is E > 0 such 
that the expected profit from uh over GE is h first order better than the expected profit 
fi-om an optimal simple menu over G,. 
To end the proof, consider ( 1  - a) F + aG for small positive a. Since u* and uh are 
h first order equivalent on F so uh weakly h first order dominates any simple menu on 
F. On the other hand uh is h first order strictly better than any simple menu on G. 
Thus for any a > 0 the menu uh first order in h strictly dominates any simple menu on 
(1 - a) F + aG. This completes the proof of the density. 
The proof of openness relies on Rochet's (1985) reformulation of the monopoly prob- 
lem. In (1) the monopoly maximizes J p  ( t )  dF ( t)  over pricing policies (p, q). The 
maximization is constrained by the individual rationality and incentive compatibility of 
' the buyers. Using incentive compatibility one can 'replace the individual rationality of 
the buyer by the assumption of zero price for a zero amount of both goods. Denote by 
Mn the set of Lebesgue absolutely continuous probability distributions on [0, lIn. As 
shown by Rochet for F E Mn the incentive constraints are equivalent to the convexity 
of the utility function u ( t)  = tq ( t)  - p (t) .  Whenever u is convex it is differentiable 
almost everywhere, and has one-sided partial derivatives everywhere on the interior of 
its domain. Denote by the right-hand side derivative operator and by V the gradient 
ou (t)  = (atu t, atu) t, ( t )  
Given the indifference-breaking assumption that indifferent buyers behave in a way 
preferred by the seller, the utility-maximizing quantity bought by a buyer is 
q ( t )  = Vu ( t )  .
and the price that the buyer pays is 
p ( t )  = tVu ( t )  - u ( t )  .
18Alternatively we could work with the standard gradient that exists almost everywhere. 
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Hence for F E Mn, the monopoly problem translates into maximizing 
P / tVu (t) - u (t) dF 
subject to u (0,O) = 0, u is convex, and V u  E [O,1In . 
Denote by U c C [O,1In the set of functions satisfying the constraints of (10). Since U 
is a closed subset of the compact space C [O,1In so U is compact in metrics inherited from 
C [O,1In .  The proof of openness relies on the following result (proved in the appendix). 
Lemma 5.2. The mapping 
is continuous. 
Proof of the openness part of Theorem 5.1. Use h c h e t  (1985) and consider the 
equivalent program (10). The compactness of U and Lemma 5.2 allow us to invoke the 
Berge's Maximum Theorem (Berge (1963, p. 116)) to conclude that 
is upper hemicontinuous. Consequently, since Ud is closed in U, so P-' (ud) is closed 
in Mn, and thus the set of complex distributions is open in Mn. 
6. How Much Is Lost By the Restriction to Simple Bundling? 
This section starts with an estimate of the worst-case scenario for a seller restricted 
to screening through simple product lines when there are two buyer types. It then 
constructs examples to show that the result of Section 4 - that in an optimal screening 
the seller may randomize over one attribute only - does not generalize to cases with 
three or more buyer types. 
Theorem 6.1. If there are only two buyer types then the maximum percentage loss 
from the restriction to simple contracts is 12.5% of the best simple menu revenue. If n 
is the number of attributes, then this bound is achieved for two types A, B E [O,1In such 
that 
It is easy to verify that for the parameters provided the loss is 12.5%. Let us prove 
that this is the maximal loss resulting from the restriction to simple contracts. 
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Denote by aC the optimal profit and by as the optimal profit 
from simple contracts. Our problem is to maximize y, or equivalently r",cTS, over 
two-type distributions (a, b)  = ((al, . . ., an) , (bl, .. ., b,)). By compactness and continuity 
of the problem the maximum exists. Notice that we can assume (4), and choose notation 
so that (5) .and (6) are satisfied. Furthermore, by Theorem 4.2, we can restrict attention 
to situations when bn > a, and n* < n**. Thus, the constraints on our problem are 
ai, bi, PA E [O, 11 (4), (5), (6), bn > an, and n* < n**- 
By Theorem 4.2, the optimal contract brings 
aC = PA (a1 + ... + a,) + (1 - PA) (nbn* + bn*+i + ... + bn) . 
Let us estimate the profits nS from the optimal simple contract from below. The fol- 
lowing two contracts are individually rational and incentive compatible: 
(I  ,..., I ; a l +  ...+ an) ,  0 ,..., O,l,..., l ;bn*+l+-.-+bn 
n* n-n* 
The first of these two contracts brings 
nsl = PA (a1 + ... + a,) + (1 - PA) (bn*+l+ ... + bn) 
and the second one brings 
nC-max{nsl ,ns2) Hence, re-IrS nc  is an upper bound on 7. 
nC-max nS1 nS2 
Let us drop the constraint n* < n** and maximize the upper bound 
subject to the remaining constraints. This is done via two claims proved in the appendix. 
Claim 1. The maximum of the auxiliary problem with any n is not higher than the 
maximum of the auxiliary problem with n = 2 and n* = 1. 
1 Claim 2. The maximum of the auxiliary problem with n = 2 and n* = 1 is E .  
?rc -max nSl ,xS2 
It remains to verify that the upper bound  = is achievable for any 
n 2 2 in the original problem. This upper bound is indeed achieved for the parameters 
stated in the theorem. This completes the proof. 
In Section 4,  we noted that when there are only two buyer types then it is enough 
for the seller to randomize over one attribute. This last corollary is false when there are 
more than two buyer types. A simple counterexample that violates this property has 
n = 3 and three buyer types 
with masses pa, p ~ ,  p c  such that p c  < < pa,  p ~ .  Then, in any optimal menu of contracts 
the probability of allocating good 1 to type C and the probability of allocating good 2 
to type C belong to ( 0 , l ) .  
The following example constructs a two-dimensional situation in which some buyers 
are allocated only lotteries. 
Example 6.2. Consider n = 2 and three types A = ( a l ,  a2 )  = (1 ,  i) , B = (bl, b2) = 
(0, ;) , C = (i , i) that occur with probabilities P A ,  p ~ ,  pc  such that pc  << p~ < < pa. 
Then, type C buys a good with lotteries for both attributes. 
Indeed, the optimal menu of contracts leads to types A and B being allocated the 
good ( 1 , l )  at the price a1 + a2 = because of the assumed condition on probabilities 
and bl + b2 > al + a2. Conditional on this allocation, the incentive compatibility of 
A and B precludes the seller from selling any full attribute to type C. The seller can, 
however, offer the contract (i, f ;  a). C will take this offer while A and B's incentive 
constraints will not be violated. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. A general form of the product line consists of two contracts 
A = (qf, ...,q:;pA) chosen by type A and B = (q;, ...,qf;pB) chosen by type B. The 
optimal menu of contracts exists by the Weierstrass maximum theorem because prices 
pA, pB E [0, n] and hence the menu of contracts corresponds to a point in the compact 
set 
([O, 11" x [O, nl) x ([O, 11" x [O, nl) 
and the function fiom menus to the profits they generate is upper hemicontinuous. 
Similarly, there exists an optimal simple menu of contracts. 
Let us first consider the problem of Theorem 4.1 and make two assumptions. First, 
notice that it is enough to consider strictly positive 
Indeed, if we prove the claim in this case then the continuity of the expected profits 
from a fixed menu of contracts with respect to a1 , . .., a,, b l ,  . . ., bn establishes the claim 
in the general case. Second, let us focus on the case 
because the case of b, 5 an is straightforward. 
There are two incentive constraints and two individual rationality constraints in 
the seller's maximization. Let us refer to them as IC-A, IC-B, IR-A, IR-B, where the 
labels are self-explanatory. Let us call a constraint slack if it may be dropped fiom the 
maximization and tight otherwise. Let us call a constraint strictly slack if it is satisfied 
with strict inequality in optimal menu of contracts, and weakly tight otherwise. 
Before characterizing the optimal menu of contracts let us prove four claims. 
Claim 1. If IC-B is weakly tight, then q: = q? = 1 for i = 1, ..., n, and pA = pB = 
bl + ... + b,. 
To prove Claim 1 first note that if IC-B is weakly tight then also IC-A is weakly 
tight. Indeed, if A strictly preferred A to B, then we would have qF = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n 
because qF < 1 for some i = 1, . . . , n would allow the seller to gainfully replace the 
contract B with 
B B B  (qf,  ..-, qi + E, . . - ,qn;p + b i ~ )  
for some small positive E. Consequently, A's strict preference of A over B would imply 
that < pB. But this is a contradiction, as then the Seller would be better off by 
proposing single contract B = (1, ..., l;pB) that would be accepted by both A and B. 
Thus, if IC-B is weakly tight then both A and B are indifferent between the contracts 
A and B. Hence, also the seller is indifferent between selling either of the products, 
and this means that pA = pB 5 bl + . . . + bn. The optimal among such contracts sets 
q: = q,P = 1 for all i = 1, ..., n and pA = pB = bl + ... + bn, which proves the claim. 
Claim 2. If IC-B is strictly slack then 
(a) q: = 1 for i = 1, ..., n, 
B (b) IR-B is weakly tight, and pB = blqf + ... + bnqn, 
(c) IC-A is weakly tight and 
To prove (a) notice that if q? < 1 for an i = 1, . . . , n, then the Seller could do 
A A A better by replacing 2 by (q f  , . . ., qi + E, . . . , qn ; p + ai&) for some small positive E. To 
show (b) notice that with IR-B strictly slack the seller could benefit by raising pR. To 
show (c) notice that with IC-A strictly slack, the seller would profitably increase any 
q? that is smaller than 1. However, q: = 1 for all i = 1, ..., nA cannot obtain as it 
would mean that the bundles offered to both types are identical, and by the incentive 
compatibility conditions their prices would have to be equal, and thus type B buyer 
would be indifferent between the contracts, contrary to the strict slackness of IC-B. 
Since IC-A is weakly tight, the formula for pA follows from (a). 
Denote 
di = a; - bi. 
By Claim 2, if IC-B is strictly slack then the seller maximizes 
subject to A's participation constraint, IR-A, 
= 5 a1 + ... + a,. a1 + ... + an - dlqF - ... - dnq, 
Consequently, when IC-B is slack then the seller's problem can be stated as 
subject to IR-A constraint 
dlq; + .-- + dnq,B 1 0. 
Claim 3. Assume that IC-B is strictly slack. The following conditions are equivalent: 
(a) IR-A is slack in the maximization (P), 
(b) dn** + ... + d, > 0, 
Indeed, unconstrained by IR-A the seller would set q: = 1 whenever 2 > PA, qy = 0 
whenever % < PA, and be indifferent what values are taken by qy whenever 2 = PA. 
Since n** denotes the minimum i such that % 2 /la, so in an IR-A unconstrained optimal 
contract q? = ... = qz.-l = 0 and q,. B = ... = q, = 1. Thus, the slackness of IR-A is 
equivalent to (b) . 
Claim 4. The following conditions are equivalent: 
1 .  
b .  (a) dnrr + ... + d, 2 0, 
(b) n** 5 n*, 
(c) PA I h- an* 
Recall that bn > a,, and thus n** E (1, . . . , n). To see the equivalence of (a) and (b) 
note that the monotonicity of 2 and definition of n* implies that di + ... + dn 2 0 iff 
2 E { 1 . . . , n* } To see the equivalence of (b) and (c) note that the monotonicity of 2 
and definition of n** implies that 2 pa iff i E In**, ..., n)  U {+oo). 
Now, we are ready to solve the seller's problem separately considering n** 5 n* and 
n* < n**. 
Case n** 5 n*. Either IC-B is strictly slack or weakly tight. This gives two potential 
solutions. By Claims 3 and 4, the solution for IC-B strictly slack may be obtained by 
solving unconstrained (P) and is written out in Theorem 4.1. The solution for IC-B 
weakly tight is given in Claim 1. It remains to check that the solution in Theorem 4.1 
is weakly better than the solution in Claim 1. 
The difference in expected profits between the solutions is 
Since an < bn, we have n** < +oo. If n** E (2, ..., n), then this difference is strictly 
positive because pa > a,**,l 2 ai for i 5 n" - 1 by definition of n** and monotonicity 
of h. In particular then IC-B is indeed strictly slack. If n** = 1, then the two solutions 
ai 
are identical (and IC-B is weakly tight). 
Case n* < n**. Then IR-A is tight, and thus (P) reduces to 
subject to 
B - dlq; + ... +&qn - 0- 
Thus, there exists k E [O,1] such that 
hi 1. - k 
qf = 1 whenever - > 
di k 7  
bi 1 - k  
qf = 0 whenever - < 
di k ' 
and q? for i such that 2 = 9 are determined by the constraint, not necessarily in a 
unique way. Equivalently 
bi qf = 1 whenever - > k 
a2 
bi qf = 0 whenever - < k 
ai 
and q? for i such that 2 = k are determined by the constraint. Note that ai > 0 for 
i = I, . . ., nA and that k 5 pa. There is some indeterminacy for i such that 2 = k. 
Without loss of generality we can assume that q: = 0 or 1 for all such i except for one, 
let us call it n*** and choose it in such a way that 
q? = 1 for i > n*** 
q,B = 0 for i < n*** 
and 
and q$.. E (0,1] .By definition of n*, this properties imply that n*** = n*. Hence, 
and the solution is as postulated in Theorem 4.1. It remains to check that this solution 
is preferred by the seller to the optimal solution with IC-B tight (described in Claim 1); 
the slackness of IC-B will be then automatically satisfied. The difference in expected 
profits from the two solutions is 
and is strictly positive (as required) because > $ > 2 for i < n*. The genericity 
claim of Theorem 4.1 is straightforward. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 5.2. First note for any u E U the function (u) such that 
(u) (t) = tVu (t) - u (t) is well-defined as Vu (t ) exists everywhere. Note that @ (u) 
is measurable, and it is bounded since Vu (t) E [O,1In. Moreover, Vu ( t )  E [0, lIn and 
u (0) = 0 for t E [0, lIn imply that 
@ (u) (t) = t v u  ( t )  - u (t) E [-12,721 
for t E [O ,1 In  and u E U .  
Take (u, F) E U x Mn and a sequence (uk, Fk) E U x Mn that tends to (u, F). We 
are to prove that uk o Fk -+ u 0 F. Note that 
and thus it is enough to show the convergence to 0 of both elements of the left-hand-side 
sum. 
Consider the first element of the sum, take a small E > 0, and note that 
For any small E > 0 the first integral tends to 0 as k + oo because uk + u uniformly and 
all those functions are convex. Moreover, by @ (u) (t) , @ (uk) (t) E [-n, n] the second 
integral is smaller than 
2nFk ([O,lIn - [0, 1 - &In). 
Since the weak convergence Fk -+ F implies the convergence 
Fk ([O, lIn - [O, 1 - &In) -+ F ([0, 11" - [o, 1 - &In) ,
F is Lebesgue absolutely continuos, and the Lebesgue measure of [O,1In - [O, 1 - &In 
tends to 0 as E --+ 0, SO the second integral can be shown to tend to 0 as k --+ ca and 
E -4 0. Taking this together we may conclude that 
It remains to show that luoFk - U O  FI --+ 0 with k + m. This is so if @(u)  is 
continuous. In general, since u is continuous, it is enough to show that 
and furthermore, we can analyze the elements of the sum tVu (t) separately, so it is 
enough to show that 
for i = 1, . . . , n. Denoting by f and fk the densities of F and Fk , respectively, we can 
write a sufficient condition for the above property as 
a+ a+ 
(t) d F  -+ 0 as k -t CQ 
a+ a+ I L,lI ti (t) f k  (t) dti ti-u (t) f (t) dti 1 at, + O as k -t oo 
for i = 1, . . ., n and any tl, ... , ti-1, ti+l, . . . , t, E [0, 11,-l. NOW, ti ti gu (t) is increasing, 
so the set of discontinuities is of measure 0. Let I be a union of intervals of total length E 
that covers the set of discontinuities. We can find a continuous cp such that cp (ti) E [O,1]  
for all ti and p (ti) = ti %U (t) if ti 9 I, and decompose 
Now, the f is t  difference tends to 0 as Fk --, F and (o is continuos. Moreover, Fk + F 
implies also that there exists an M independent of I such that for large k, the second 
difference is smaller than ME. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Claims 1 and 2 fiom the proof of Theorem 6.1. 
Claim 1. The maximum of the auxiliary problem with any n is not higher thanthe 
maimurn of the auxiliary problem with n = 2 and n* = 1. 
Let us prove this claim in two steps. First notice that if n* + 1 < n then the lower 
dimensional problem with n' = n* + 1 attributes and valuations 
;rrC-max nS1 S2 
satisfies all constraints and attains the same objective . 
Second, notice that if n* > 1 then the lower dimensional problem with n' = n - n* + 1 
and 
a: = a,*-l+i, b: = bn*-l+i7 for i = 1, ..., n' 
satisfies the constraints. Indeed, (5) is not violated because the definition of n* implies 
that 
a,* + ... a, > bn* + ... + b,. 
Other constraints are satisfied in a straightforward manner. This lower dimensional 
nC-max{?rS1,?rs2) problem attains weakly higher objective TC as the nominator does not 
change and the denominator weakly increases. This proves Claim 1. 
1 Claim 2. The maximum of the auxiliary problem with n = 2 and n* = 1 is 5. 
Without changing the maximum, we can add variable .rr to the set of variables we 
maximize over, and add its definition (8) to the set of constraints. Thus, the problem 
takes the form 
nc - rnax {xS1, nS2) 
- max {aS1, xs2} max fl  -1- n 
subject to ai, bi, PA E [O, l] , (4), (5), (6) ,  (8), bz > a2- 
First, notice that at the maximum 
Indeed, if PA (1 - x) [bl - all + (1 - PA) bl < 0 at the maximum, then the objective 
could be made arbitrarily close to 1 by taking PA = 0, .rr - 1 (i.e., a1 - bl - b2 - a2), and 
b2 << bl. If PA (1 - n) [bl - all + (1 - pA) bl > 0 at the maximum, then the objective 
could be made arbitrarily close to 1 by taking aa, bl, bz - 0 and a1 >i 0 (note that then 
also n - 0). 
Taking (11) into account, we can reduce the auxiliary problem to 
max (1 - PA) "bl 
al9a2,bi9bz9rn7* PA (a1 + a2) + (1 - pA) (nbl + b2) 
subject to bl E [0,1],al,b2,x E ( O , l ] ,  (B), ( l l ) ,  and a1 > bl. 
Second, notice that the objective increases and all constraints are satisfied when we 
decrease a2 and bz while maintaining (8). Thus, at the maximum, a2 = 0, and (8) 
implies that 
b2 = n (al - bl) . 
At the same time, (11) implies that 
Plugging these two expressions into the maximization, we can reduce it further to 
rnax 
(1 - n) (a1 - bl] .rrbl 
al,bl,n blal + (1 - n) [al - bl] (nbl + .rr (al - bl)) 
subject to bl E [O, 11, al, r E (0, 11, and a1 > bl. 
Third, notice that bl > 0 at the maximum and thus we can simplify the problem 
further to 
max 
1 
1 A+% ai7bi7x - (1-n)x al -bl bl 
subject to bl, al, r E (0, 11, and a1 > bl. At the maximum, r = i. Substituting x = 2 
we reduce the problem to minimizing the denominator f (x) = 4 5  + x over x > 1. 
The problem is convex as f" (x) = L g  > 0. Thus, the minimum is achieved at 
(2-1) 
f' (x) = 4& + 1 = 0, that is at x = 3. The minimum equals .+ = and Claim 2 42+3 
is proved. 
